Wie sich das GKV-Beitragssatz-
Stabilisierungs-Gesetz (BStabG) auf die
Innovationsfähigkeit der Pharmabranche
und die Arzneimittelversorgung auswirkt
Die zentralen Aspekte auf einen Blick
• Die im BStabG geplanten Sparmaßnahmen zielen hauptsächlich auf den
Patentmarkt, aber auch der Generikamarkt ist betroffen.1
• Rund 85 Prozent dieses patentgeschützten Arzneimittelmarktes entfallen auf
Arzneimittel gegen lebensbedrohliche oder schwere chronische
Erkrankungen: Krebs, schwere Autoimmun- und Entzündungserkrankungen,
Schlaganfall-Prävention und Thrombose sowie Diabetes mit
Folgeerkrankungen.2
• Die GKV-Arzneimittelausgaben lagen 2025 bei 58,49 Mrd. Euro (+5,9 % im
Vergleich zum Vorjahreszeitraum). Mit einem Anstieg der Leistungsausgaben
um 5,9% ist das Wachstum im Vergleich zu anderen Leistungsbereichen
unterdurchschnittlich. Zur Einordnung: die Leistungsausgaben stiegen um 7,9
%, Ausgaben für Krankenhausbehandlungen um 9,6 %, Ausgaben für
ambulant ärztliche Behandlungen um 7,6%.
1BMG, Finanzentwicklung GKV 2025; AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025.
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/meldungen/finanzentwicklung-gkv-2025
2Eigene Berechnung auf Basis IQVIA-Marktbericht Q4/2025 (GKV-Gesamtmarkt 59,3 Mrd. €) und AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025
(patentgeschützter Markt = 54 % der Kosten). https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-
marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/meldungen/finanzentwicklung-gkv-2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
• 3Der geplante (dynamische) Herstellerabschlag kann den Zwangsrabatt auf
innovative Arzneimittel bis 2030 auf über 20 Prozent treiben – eine
Verfünffachung der jährlichen Belastung von 1,1 auf 5,5 Mrd. Euro.4
• Die Maßnahmen wirken kumulierend. Dynamischer Herstellerabschlag,
neue Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, Preis-Mengen-
Regelungen und das verlängerte Preismoratorium treffen dieselben
Arzneimittel gleichzeitig und übereinander gelagert. Damit gefährdet nicht nur
jede Maßnahme für sich, sondern insbesondere ihr Zusammenwirken Zugang,
Therapievielfalt und Standort.5
• Die Preissenkungen wirken additiv auf bereits verhandelte Preise. Also
Preise, die im Rahmen des AMNOG-Verfahrens bereits auf der Basis von
Nutzenbewertungen gefunden wurden. Aus dieser Basis wurde mit der
Krankenkasse ein Preis verhandelt, der dem Wert des Arzneimittels für
Patienten entspricht.
• Die Pharmaindustrie ist mit einer Investitionsquote von 5,7 Prozent die
investitionsstärkste Industrie Deutschlands. Kurzfristige, kumulierende
Preiseingriffe gefährden langfristig geplante Standortinvestitionen.6
4Pharma Deutschland: Risiken des GKV-BStabG für Arzneimittelversorgung und Innovation.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-
innovation/
5Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
6IW Köln, PharmaKompakt 2025.
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Gutachten/Pharma_Standort_D/2025/PharmaKompakt_2025_DE.pdf
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Gutachten/Pharma_Standort_D/2025/PharmaKompakt_2025_DE.pdf
Verteilung des GKV-Umsatzes nach
Erkrankungsschwere (2025)
Das GKV-BStabG belastet ausgerechnet den Marktteil am stärksten, der die
Versorgung Schwerstkranker sichert und die forschungs- und investitionsstärkste
Industrie Deutschlands trägt.7
Erkrankungskategorie Beispiel-Wirkstoffklassen (Cluster) GKV-Umsatz
2025* Anteil**
Krebserkrankungen &
Immuntherapien
MAB-Antineoplastika,
Proteinkinasehemmer,
Hormonantagonisten
~ 9,5 – 10,1
Mrd. € ~ 39 %
Schwere Autoimmun-
/Entzündungserkrankungen
Anti-TNF, Interleukin-Inhibitoren,
JAK-Inhibitoren, MS-Mittel
~ 6,8 – 7,0
Mrd. € ~ 28 %
Diabetes mit schweren
Komplikationen
SGLT2-Hemmer, GLP-1-Agonisten,
Insulin-Analoga
~ 5,0 – 5,2
Mrd. € ~ 21 %
Schlaganfall-Prävention &
Thrombose
Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer
(Apixaban, Rivaroxaban, Edoxaban)
~ 2,9 – 3,0
Mrd. € ~ 12 %
Summe vier Cluster
Summe
schwere/lebensbedrohliche
Erkrankungen (vier Cluster)
~ 24,2 – 25,3
Mrd. €
~ 41 – 43
% des
GKV-
Marktes
\.GKV‗Umsatz.868❶.(IQVIA.Apothekenmarkt?.Jan Dez.868❶)¡.\\.Anteil.der.ersten.drei.Spalten.am.umsatzstarken.
Marktsegment.der.vier.Cluster.(∫ .80?8 8❶?9.Mrd¡.₭)·.die.letzte.Zeile.bezieht.den.Anteil.auf.den.GKV‗Gesamtmarkt.(❶❺?9.Mrd¡.
₭)¡.Werte.gerundet·.Schätzung.auf.Basis.der.ATC‗Gruppen.und.Hauptindikationen¡
7Eigene Berechnung auf Basis der ATC-Umsätze 2025 (IQVIA Q4/2025) der vier Versorgungscluster. Der Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025
bestätigt qualitativ, dass es sich „ganz überwiegend um Arzneimittel gegen sehr schwere bis mittelschwere Erkrankungen“ handelt.
https://www.mwv-
berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d209028
29b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
Die vier Therapie-Cluster (Datenbasis 2025)
Die umsatzstärksten patentgeschützten Präparate ordnen sich vier Versorgungs-
Clustern zu. Für jedes Cluster sind Leit-Wirkstoffklassen, GKV-Umsatz 2025 und
Marktentwicklung dargestellt.
Übersicht: Cluster-Umsätze im GKV-Markt 2025
Therapie-Cluster GKV-Umsatz
2025 (Schätzung)
Anteil
Gesamtmarkt
Wachstum
vs. 2024
Leit-
Wirkstoffklassen
Onkologie &
Immuntherapien 9,5 – 10,1 Mrd. € 16 – 17 % +10 – 12 %
MAB-Antineoplastika,
Proteinkinasehemmer,
Hormonantagonisten
Autoimmun- &
entzündliche
Erkrankungen
6,8 – 7,0 Mrd. € 11,5 – 11,8 % -5 bis -8 %
Anti-TNF, Interleukin-
Inhibitoren, JAK-
Inhibitoren, MS-Mittel
Diabetes &
Stoffwechsel 5,0 – 5,2 Mrd. € 8,5 – 8,8 % +20 – 25 %
SGLT2-Hemmer,
GLP-1-Agonisten,
Insulin-Analoga
Herz-Kreislauf &
Thrombose (B01) 2,9 – 3,0 Mrd. € ~ 5,0 % +0,8 %
(B01F)
Direkte Faktor-Xa-
Hemmer, ARNI,
PCSK9-Inhibitoren
Quelle¿.IQVIA.Pharma‗Marktbericht.Q0―868❶.(Gesamtjahr.868❶?.ATC‗Gruppen)·.ergänzt.um.GAmSi.Bayern.Q7―868❶.und.
Arzneimittel‗Atlas.868❶¡.Schätzungen·.Überschneidungen.(SGLT8‗Hemmer.Diabetes―Herz‗Kreislauf).im.Text.gekennzeichnet¡.
Vier.Cluster.gesamt.∫ .80?8 8❶?9.Mrd¡.₭.(∫ .07 09.↘ .des.GKV‗Marktes)¡8
8IQVIA Pharma-Marktbericht Q4/2025; GAmSi Bayern KV71 Q1/2025; IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025. https://www.iqvia.com/-
/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Onkologie & Immuntherapien
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 9,5 – 10,1 Mrd. € (L01G 4.327 Mio. € +5,8 %; L01H 3.298 Mio. €
+14,0 %; L02B 1.502 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen
Diverse Krebserkrankungen: nicht-kleinzelliges Lungenkarzinom,
Melanom, multiples Myelom, chronische lymphatische Leukämie,
Mammakarzinom, Prostatakarzinom u. v. m.
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
PD-1/PD-L1-Inhibitoren (Checkpoint-Inhibition), Proteinkinasehemmer
(CDK-, BTK-Inhibitoren), CD38-Antikörper, EGFR-Inhibitoren,
zytostatische Hormonantagonisten
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Plattformtechnologien (Antikörper, Checkpoint-Inhibition),
biopharmazeutische Produktion, Kombinations- und
Sequenztherapien; höchste Wachstumsrate aller Cluster
(Proteinkinasehemmer L01H +14,0 % p. a.).
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Ein onkologisches bereits preisverhandeltes Präparat kann gleichzeitig vom
(dynamischen) Herstellerabschlag, vom Rabattvertrag für patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel (PD-1/PD-L1- bzw. PARP-Inhibitoren als Pilotgruppen) und
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarungen getroffen werden.
• Rabattverträge auf PD-1/PD-L1- und PARP-Inhibitoren zwingen
therapeutisch nicht beliebig austauschbare Wirkstoffe in einen
Preiswettbewerb.
• Die zusätzlichen Abschläge machen Markteinführungen neuer Indikationen
unkalkulierbar.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025; GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025; Der Arzneimittelbrief 2026
https://der-arzneimittelbrief.com/artikel/2026/keytruda-teuerstes-krebsmedikament-moegliche-einsparpotenziale-und-wie-krankenkassen-unnoetig-finanziell-belastet-werden
Cluster Autoimmun- & entzündliche Erkrankungen
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 6,8 – 7,0 Mrd. € (L04C 2.404 Mio. € -24,1 %; L04B 2.242 Mio. € -4,1
%; N07A MS 1.681 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen
Rheumatoide Arthritis, Psoriasis/Psoriasisarthritis, Morbus Crohn,
Colitis ulcerosa, atopische Dermatitis, Multiple Sklerose, Spondylitis
ankylosans
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
Anti-TNF-Inhibitoren (Adalimumab), Interleukin-Inhibitoren
(Ustekinumab, Risankizumab, Secukinumab, Dupilumab), JAK-
Inhibitoren (Upadacitinib), MS-Mittel
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Biologika und niedermolekulare Immunmodulatoren (JAK),
Indikationserweiterungen über mehrere chronische Erkrankungen;
bereits intensiver Biosimilar-Wettbewerb (L04C -24,1 % Umsatz bei
nur -4,9 % Absatz, getrieben durch das Ustekinumab-Biosimilar).
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Das Cluster steht bereits unter starkem Biosimilar-Preiswettbewerb
(Umsatz L04C -24,1 % zzgl. hoher vertraulicher Rabatte). Der (dynamische)
Herstellerabschlag legt sich zusätzlich auf die verbleibenden
patentgeschützten Wirkstoffe – mit dem Risiko, dass einzelne Indikationen
unwirtschaftlich werden.
• JAK-Inhibitoren stehen auf der Pilotliste für Rabattverträge auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel. Sie werden damit doppelt erfasst: durch den
dynamischen Abschlag und durch einen Substitutionszwang nach
Rabattvertrag – trotz unterschiedlicher Sicherheitsprofile und Zulassungen.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (L04C 2.404 Mio. €, L04B 2.242 Mio. €); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Diabetes & Stoffwechsel
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 5,0 – 5,2 Mrd. € (A10P SGLT2 2.013 Mio. € +15,1 %; A10S GLP-1
1.261 Mio. € +56,0 %; A10C Insulin 1.186 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen Typ-2-Diabetes, Herzinsuffizienz (HFrEF/HFpEF), chronische
Niereninsuffizienz; kardiometabolische Folgeerkrankungen
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
SGLT2-Hemmer (Empagliflozin, Dapagliflozin), GLP-1-Agonisten
(Semaglutid, Tirzepatid), Insulin-Analoga
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Indikationsausweitung kardiometabolischer Wirkstoffe (Herz, Niere);
stärkstes Mengen- und Umsatzwachstum im gesamten GKV-Markt
(GLP-1-Agonisten +56 % Umsatz, +24,2 % Absatz), hohe Public-
Health-Relevanz.
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Der (dynamische) Herstellerabschlag koppelt die Rabatthöhe an das
Ausgabenwachstum des Patentmarktes. Gerade die wachstumsstärksten
Cluster – SGLT2-Hemmer (+15,1 %) und GLP-1-Agonisten (+56 %) –
treiben damit ihren eigenen Zwangsrabatt nach oben und kumulieren so
die Belastung über die Jahre.
• Die Preis-Mengen-Regelung als gesetzliche Auffanglösung (ohne
Schiedsstellenbefassung) legt sich zusätzlich auf volumenstarke
Stoffwechseltherapien und erhöht die Belastung ein weiteres Mal.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (A10P, A10S, A10C); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Herz-Kreislauf & Thrombose
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 2,9 – 3,0 Mrd. € (B01F Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer 2.705 Mio. € +0,8
%); mit Lipidsenkern/PCSK9 ≈ 4,4 – 5,0 Mrd. €
Versorgte Indikationen
Schlaganfall-Prävention bei Vorhofflimmern, Therapie und Prophylaxe
von Venenthrombose und Lungenembolie, Herzinsuffizienz,
Sekundärprävention kardiovaskulärer Ereignisse
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer (Apixaban, Rivaroxaban, Edoxaban), ARNI
(Sacubitril/Valsartan), PCSK9-Inhibitoren
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Großvolumige Versorgung mit hohem Public-Health-Nutzen
(Schlaganfall-Vermeidung); Lebenszyklus-Management und
Folgeindikationen.
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• PCSK9-Inhibitoren sind eine der fünf Pilot-Wirkstoffgruppen für
Rabattverträge – ein Eingriff in die Sekundärprävention. Gleichzeitig greift
auf patentgeschützte Wirkstoffe des Clusters der (dynamische)
Herstellerabschlag; beide Maßnahmen wirken übereinander.
• Faktor-Xa-Hemmer (orale Antikoagulanzien, B01F: 2.705 Mio. € 2025)
zählen zu den umsatzstärksten Präparaten überhaupt und sind
lebensnotwendig für die Schlaganfall-Prävention. Diese pauschalen,
kumulierenden Abschläge gefährden die wirtschaftliche Versorgung
großer Patientengruppen.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (B01F 2.704,5 Mio. €); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Die pharmarelevanten Maßnahmen des GKV-BStabG
(Dynamischer) Herstellerabschlag (§ 130a Abs. 1b SGB V-E)
Was
Der bestehende Herstellerabschlag von 7 % auf patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel wird um eine dynamische Komponente ergänzt, die an die
Ausgabenentwicklung im Patentmarkt gekoppelt ist. Alternativ ist auch ein
fixer Gesamtrabatt von 15,5% in der Diskussion
Zeitplan
Jan.–Jun. 2027: statisch +3,5 Prozentpunkte (= 10,5 %). Ab Juli 2027:
jährlich dynamisch berechneter Zusatzabschlag, Höhe abhängig von
Ausgaben- und Einnahmenentwicklung.
Finanzieller
Umfang
1,1 Mrd. € (2027) bis 5,5 Mrd. € (2030) – eine Verfünffachung; Simulationen
zeigen einen Gesamtabschlag von über 20 % bis 2030.
Ausnahmen
Festbetragsarzneimittel, Generika, Biosimilars, Impfstoffe, patentfreie
versorgungskritische Arzneimittel nach §52b Abs. 3c AMG, patentfreie
Kinderarzneimittel nach §35 Abs. 5a SGB V, vom Preismoratorium befreite
Arzneimittel, Reserveantibiotika, Wirkstoffe mit klinischen Studien und
Produktion in Deutschland.
Auswirkungen
• Ein (dynamischer, jährlich neu festgesetzter) Zwangsrabatt entzieht
Investitions- und Standortentscheidungen die Kalkulations- und
Planungsgrundlage.
• Jeder zusätzliche Euro Rabatterhöhung schadet der Volkswirtschaft um bis
zu 3,80 Euro.9
Quellen¿.Pharma.Deutschland.―.vfa‗Factsheet·.BMG‗Referentenentwurf¡10
9VCI, Pressemitteilung zum GKV-Sparpaket, April 2026. https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-
bundesregierung.jsp
10Pharma Deutschland: Risiken des GKV-BStabG für Arzneimittelversorgung und Innovation.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-
innovation/
https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-bundesregierung.jsp
https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-bundesregierung.jsp
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
(§ 130e SGB V-E, neu)
Was
Krankenkassen dürfen erstmals Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel mit therapeutisch vergleichbarer Wirkung abschließen
(Clusterausschreibungen). Vertragsärzte müssen rabattierte Arzneimittel
verordnen. Ausnahmen sind unter hohem bürokratischem Aufwand zu
begründen..
Pilotphase
Vorerst befristet bis 31.12.2030, zunächst fünf Wirkstoffgruppen: JAK-
Inhibitoren, CGRP-Antagonisten, PARP-Inhibitoren, PCSK9-Inhibitoren, PD-
1/PD-L1-Inhibitoren.
Bericht über die Auswirkungen durch den GKV SV an das BMG.
Cluster-
Betroffenheit
Direkter Eingriff in Onkologie (PD-1/PD-L1, PARP), Herz-Kreislauf (PCSK9),
Autoimmun (JAK) und Neurologie (CGRP).
Auswirkungen
• Innovative, oft nicht gleichwertige Wirkstoffe werden nach ihrer
Nutzenbewertung im AMNOG in einen reinen Preiswettbewerb gezwungen.
Das Ergebnis des AMNOG Verfahrens wird damit gänzlich entwertet. Das
RisikoDas Risiko für die Versorgung sind Marktrücknahmen und eine
eingeschränkte Therapiewahl für Patientinnen und Patienten. Die
Maßnahmen führen zu einer Verschlechterung der Versorgung für bestimmte
Therapiegebiete
• Rabattverträge waren bislang Generika vorbehalten. Ihre Ausweitung auf
den Patentmarkt unterläuft die bereits verhandelten AMNOG-
Erstattungsbeträge und addiert sich auf den dynamischen
Herstellerabschlag derselben Wirkstoffe.
Quellen¿.Pharma.Deutschland¿.Inhalte.des.GKV‗BStabG¡11
11Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
Preis-Mengen-Regelung
Was Die im Rahmen der 130b SGB V zu verhandelnde Preis-Mengen Regelung
wird gesetzlich festgeschrieben.
Finanzieller
Umfang
Je 100 Mio.€ Umsatz plus 1% Preisabschlag. Das ist eine Verzehnfachung
der bisherigen Preis-Mengen-Regel die im Rahmen des GKV-FinStabG in
2023 geschaffen wurde
Cluster-
Betroffenheit
Alle Arzneimittel mit Erstattungsbetrag nach §130b SGB V, Rückwirkung
durch Sonderkündigungsrecht
Auswirkungen
• Eine starrer Preis-Mengen-Algorithmus nimmt der Kassen und der Industrie
Verhandlungsfreiheit. Es kann nicht mehr der Einzelfall berücksichtigt
werden
• Mengen steigen durch mehr Nachfrage nach einem Arzneimittel. Gründe
dafür sind Demographie (mehr Arzneimittelverbrauch) oder der hohe Nutzen
für den Patient. Diese Regelung bestrafft also gerade Arzneimittel, die für
den Patienten einen hohen Wert bieten
Kumulative Wirkung der Maßnahmen
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel und die Preis-
Mengen greifen gleichzeitig und übereinander in die Innovationscluster Onkologie,
Autoimmun, Diabetes und Herz-Kreislauf ein. Diese kumulierenden Effekte werden
sich unmittelbar auf die Therapievielfalt, die Markteinführungen und die langfristige
Produktionsinvestitionen am Standort Deutschland auswirken und sich bei der
Arzneimittelversorgung, der Wirtschaftskraft der Pharmazeutischen Industrie und
damit der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Deutschlands negativ bemerkbar machen.
Die kombinierte Netto-Belastung der Pharmaindustrie aus dynamischem
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträgen und Preis-Mengen-Regelung beziffert das BMG
für 2030 auf 5,75 Mrd. Euro – knapp 19 % der Gesamteinsparungen über alle
Sektoren, obwohl der Arzneimittelmarkt nur 12% der Leistungsausgaben ausmacht.
Instrument Aktuell Geplant 2027
Allg. Herstellerabschlag 7 % 10,5 % (dynamisch)
Alternativ fixer
Herstellerabschlag 7% 15,5%
Rabattverträge Patent-AM nicht möglich
Pilot für 5 Wirkstoffgruppen,
Annahme 30% Rabatt
(Techniker Krankenkasse in
Pharma Dialog Äußerungen
von 50%)
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarung 0,1% pro 100
Mio € 1% pro 100 Mio €
Mehrfachbelastung je Cluster
Die folgende Matrix macht sichtbar, dass die meisten Cluster nicht von einer, sondern
von mehreren Maßnahmen gleichzeitig getroffen werden. Genau diese Überlagerung –
nicht die einzelne Maßnahme – ist die eigentliche Gefahr für Innovation und Versorgung.
Cluster AMNOG
Prozess
(Dyn.)
Herstellerabschlag
Rabattvertrag
(Pilot)
Preis-
Mengen-
Regelung
Belastungsstufen
Onkologie &
Immuntherapien ja ja ja (PD-1/PD-
L1, PARP) ja 4-fach
Autoimmun &
Entzündung ja ja ja (JAK) – 3-fach
Herz-Kreislauf &
Thrombose ja ja ja (PCSK9) – 3-fach
Diabetes &
Stoffwechsel ja ja
(selbstverstärkend) – – 2-fach
Lesehilfe¿.«Belastungsstufen».zählt?.wie.viele.der.kritisierten.Instrumente.einen.Cluster.direkt.erfassen¡.Das.Onkologie‗
Cluster.trägt.mit.vier.sich.überlagernden.Maßnahmen.die.höchste.kumulative.Belastung·.im.Diabetes‗Cluster.verstärkt.der.
dynamische.Abschlag.durch.die.Wachstumskopplung.sich.selbst¡12
12Eigene Darstellung auf Basis Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-BStabG; § 130a/§ 130e SGB V-E.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
Zwei exemplarische Beispiele wie sich die
Kumulation finanziell auswirken wird am Beispiel des
statischen Herstellerabschlages
Ein Onkologikum oder ein anderes patentgeschütztes Präparat kann 2027 ff. zusätzlich
zum bereits verhandelten AMNOG-Erstattungsbetrag und zum Preismoratorium zur
selben Zeit dem (dynamischen) Herstellerabschlag, einem Rabattvertrag (PD-1/PD-L1
oder PARP) und Preis-Mengenvereinbarungen unterliegen.
Jede Maßnahme aus dem GKV-Beitragssatz-Stabilisierungs-Gesetz mag für sich
begrenzt erscheinen. In der Überlagerung der Maßnahmen entsteht eine Belastung, die
einzelne Indikationen oder Wirkstoffe unwirtschaftlich machen und zu
Marktrücknahmen führen kann.
Instrument Präparat xy 100 Mio €
Umsatz
Präparat xy 500 Mio €
Umsatz
AMNOG Verfahren z.B.
Beträchtlicher Zusatznutzen -30%
verhandelter Erstattungsbetrag,
(Mittelwert AMNOG
Verhandlungen,
Herstellerabschlag abgelöst)
-30% bereits erfolgt -30% bereits erfolgt
Neu:
Allg. Herstellerabschlag -15,5% 15,5%
Rabattverträge Patent-AM
(geschätzt anhand von
Kassenerwartungen)
-30% -30%
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarung 100 Mio € x 1% = -1% 500 Mio € x 1% = -5%
Ergebnis in Prozent (Summe
Maßnahmen BStabG) -46,5% - 50,5%
Ergebnis in € (Summe
Maßnahmen BStabG) 53,5 Mio € nach Rabatten 247,5 Mio € nach Rabatten
Diese Beispiele zeigen sehr eindrücklich was für extreme Auswirkungen die Kumulation
der Rabatte auf die Umsätze der Industrie hat. Dieses wird noch verschärft durch
internationale Preisreferenzierung, die die Auswirkungen auf den internationalen
Märkten für die Industrie ca. mit dem Faktor 4 erhöht.
Jedes Unternehmen muss sich die betriebswirtschaftliche Frage stellen, ob es
ökonomisch sinnvoll ist die Arzneimittel in Deutschland weiter zu vertreiben. Das ist
keine Drohung, sondern betriebswirtschaftliche Realität, wie in jeder anderen Branche
auch.
Einordnung und Methodik
• Pharma Deutschland hat die Wirkung des GKV-
Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes (GKV-BStabG) auf die forschende
Pharmaindustrie in Deutschland analysiert. Als Grundgesamtheit dienen die
umsatzstärksten patentgeschützten Präparate bzw. ihre Hersteller im
deutschen GKV-Markt. Die Darstellung der Auswirkungen erfolgt nach vier
Therapie-Clustern, um die gesellschaftliche Bedeutung der betroffenen
Versorgung in den Vordergrund zu stellen.
• Der GKV-Arzneimittelmarkt erreichte 2025 ein Volumen von rund 58,49 Mrd.
Euro (+5,9 % gegenüber 2024);13. Auf patentgeschützte Arzneimittel entfielen
davon rund 54 Prozent der Kosten. Genau dieser hochinnovative Patentmarkt
steht im Zentrum der geplanten Sparmaßnahmen.
• Alle quantitativen Aussagen sind über Fußnoten mit den jeweiligen Primär- bzw.
Verbandsquellen belegt. Die Marktwerte 2025 stammen aus dem IQVIA
Pharma-Marktbericht Q4/2025 (Gesamtjahr 2025, Bundesdaten) und dem BMG
(KV45). Cluster-Umsätze sind Schätzungen auf Basis der ATC-Gruppen des
IQVIA-Berichts 2025 und der GAmSi-Quartalsdaten (Bayern KV71 Q1/2025)
sowie der Hauptindikationen; Überschneidungen zwischen Clustern (z. B.
SGLT2-Hemmer in Diabetes und Herzinsuffizienz) sind möglich und im Text
gekennzeichnet.
Quellen und Hinweise:
• Die Datenbasis bilden der GKV-GAmSi-Quartalsbericht 2025, die IQVIA
Pharma-Marktberichte Q2–Q4/2025 mit Bundesdaten für das Gesamtjahr 2025,
der IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025, der AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025, das
arznei-telegramm 8/2025 sowie ergänzende Verbands- und
Ministeriumsquellen.
• Zentrale Primärquellen sind insbesondere IQVIA Pharma-Marktbericht Q2–
Q4/2025, BMG Finanzentwicklung GKV 2025 (KV45), GKV-GAmSi Bayern
KV71 Q1/2025, IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025, AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass
2025, arznei-telegramm 8/2025, IW Köln PharmaKompakt 2025, vfa AMNOG-
Daten und der BMG-Referentenentwurf zum GKV-BStabG.
• Die Cluster-Umsätze sind Schätzungen auf Basis der ATC-Gruppen und der
Hauptindikationen; Überschneidungen zwischen Clustern, etwa bei SGLT2-
Hemmern in Diabetes und Herzinsuffizienz, sind möglich und im Text
gekennzeichnet.
• Vollständige URLs finden sich in den Fußnoten.
Abkürzungs- und Begriffsverzeichnis
Gesetze und Paragrafen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AMNOG Arzneimittelmarkt-
Neuordnungsgesetz
Seit 2011 geltendes Gesetz. Regelt, dass für
jedes neue Arzneimittel der Zusatznutzen
bewertet und daraufhin ein Erstattungspreis
mit den Kassen verhandelt wird.
GKV-BStabG GKV-
Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz
Das im Fact-Sheet analysierte „Spargesetz
2025/26“. Soll die Beitragssätze der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
stabilisieren – u. a. durch neue Abschläge auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel.
SGB V Fünftes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch Das zentrale Gesetzbuch zur gesetzlichen
Krankenversicherung in Deutschland.
SGB V-E Sozialgesetzbuch V –
Entwurfsfassung
Der Zusatz „-E“ kennzeichnet eine geplante,
noch nicht in Kraft getretene Fassung
(Gesetzentwurf).
§ 130a SGB V Paragraf zum Herstellerabschlag
Rechtsgrundlage für den (auch dynamischen)
Zwangsrabatt, den Hersteller den Kassen
gewähren müssen.
§ 130b SGB V Paragraf zur
Erstattungsbetragsverhandlung
Regelt die AMNOG-Preisverhandlung; Abs. 3
enthielt die sogenannten „Leitplanken“.
§ 130e SGB V Paragraf zu Kombinations- und
Patent-Rabatten
Rechtsgrundlage für den
Kombinationsabschlag und – neu geplant – für
Rabattverträge auf patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel.
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht Höchstes deutsches Gericht; prüfte 2025 die
Verhältnismäßigkeit des Preismoratoriums.
G-BA Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss
Oberstes Beschlussgremium der
Selbstverwaltung im Gesundheitswesen;
benennt u. a. die von Abschlägen betroffenen
Wirkstoff-Kombinationen.
Institutionen, Verbände und Datenquellen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AOK Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Größte gesetzliche Krankenkassengruppe;
gibt den „Arzneimittel-Kompass“ heraus.
arznei-telegramm Unabhängiger Arzneimittel-
Informationsdienst
Herstellerunabhängige Fachpublikation zur
Bewertung von Arzneimitteln.
BMG Bundesministerium für Gesundheit Zuständiges Ministerium; veröffentlicht u. a.
die GKV-Finanzentwicklung (Statistik „KV45“).
BPI Bundesverband der
Pharmazeutischen Industrie
Branchenverband der Pharmaindustrie in
Deutschland.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
CDMO Contract Development and
Manufacturing Organization
Auftragsentwickler und -hersteller;
Dienstleister, die Arzneimittel für andere
Firmen produzieren.
GAmSi GKV-Arzneimittel-
Schnellinformation
Amtliche, zeitnahe Statistik über
Arzneimittelverordnungen zu Lasten der
gesetzlichen Krankenkassen.
GKV Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
Das solidarisch finanzierte
Pflichtversicherungssystem, in dem rund 90 %
der Bevölkerung versichert sind.
GKV-Spitzenverband Spitzenverband Bund der
Krankenkassen
Zentrale Interessenvertretung aller
gesetzlichen Kranken- und Pflegekassen;
verhandelt u. a. die Erstattungsbeträge.
IGES IGES Institut
Forschungs- und Beratungsinstitut im
Gesundheitswesen; erstellt den „Arzneimittel-
Atlas“.
IQVIA IQVIA
(Marktforschungsunternehmen)
Führender Anbieter von Markt- und
Verordnungsdaten im Gesundheitswesen;
Quelle des „Pharma-Marktberichts“.
IW Köln Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft
Köln
Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut; erstellt u. a. die
Studie „PharmaKompakt“.
KV45 / KV71 Amtliche GKV-Finanz- bzw.
Statistikvordrucke
Standardisierte Meldeformulare der Kassen;
„KV45“ = GKV-Finanzergebnisse, „KV71“ =
regionale Verordnungsstatistik (hier Bayern).
MWV Medizinisch Wissenschaftliche
Verlagsgesellschaft
Verlag, in dem u. a. der Arzneimittel-Atlas
erscheint.
VCI Verband der Chemischen Industrie Branchenverband der Chemie- und
Pharmaindustrie in Deutschland.
vfa Verband forschender
Arzneimittelhersteller
Interessenverband der forschenden
Pharmaunternehmen in Deutschland.
Sparmaßnahmen und Begriffe der Preisregulierung
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AMNOG-Leitplanken Preisobergrenzen im AMNOG-
Verfahren
Gesetzliche Deckelung des verhandelbaren
Preises je nach Zusatznutzen. Werden durch
das GKV-BStabG abgeschafft (Erfolg aus
Branchensicht).
Dynamischer
Herstellerabschlag
An das Ausgabenwachstum
gekoppelter Zwangsrabatt
Pflichtrabatt der Hersteller auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, der mit
steigenden Patentmarkt-Ausgaben
automatisch mitwächst – Kern der Kritik im
Fact-Sheet.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
Erstattungsbetrag Verhandelter Preis in der GKV
Der zwischen Hersteller und Kassen
ausgehandelte Preis, den die GKV für ein
neues Arzneimittel erstattet.
Festbetrag Erstattungshöchstgrenze für
Arzneimittelgruppen
Fester Höchstbetrag, den die Kasse für
vergleichbare Wirkstoffe zahlt; darüber zahlt
der Patient die Differenz.
Herstellerabschlag Gesetzlicher Pflichtrabatt der
Hersteller
Fester (bislang 7 %) Zwangsrabatt auf den
Herstellerabgabepreis patentgeschützter
Arzneimittel.
Kombinationsabschlag Rabatt auf Kombinationstherapien
(§ 130e)
Seit Oktober 2024 20 % Abschlag auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, die in vom G-
BA benannten Kombinationen eingesetzt
werden.
Nutzenbewertung Bewertung des Zusatznutzens
(AMNOG)
Prüfung, ob ein neues Arzneimittel gegenüber
der bisherigen Standardtherapie einen
belegten Zusatznutzen bietet.
Preismoratorium Einfrieren der Herstellerpreise
Seit 2010 sind die Herstellerpreise auf dem
Stand von August 2009 eingefroren;
Verlängerung bis 2030 geplant.
Preis-Mengen-
Regelung
Automatische Preissenkung bei
hohen Absatzmengen
Mechanismus, der bei stark steigenden
Verordnungsmengen den Preis senkt – als
gesetzliche Auffanglösung vorgesehen.
Rabattverträge Exklusive Preisvereinbarungen
einzelner Kassen
Bisher nur bei Generika üblich; sollen künftig
(Pilot) auch für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
gelten, mit Substitutionspflicht für Ärzte.
Substitution Austausch durch ein anderes
Präparat
Ersetzen des verordneten Arzneimittels durch
ein rabattiertes, therapeutisch vergleichbares
Präparat.
Tagesdosen (DDD) Definierte Tagesdosis (Defined
Daily Dose)
Statistische Maßeinheit für die verordnete
Arzneimittelmenge – erlaubt
Mengenvergleiche unabhängig vom Preis.
Zwangsrabatt Gesetzlich vorgeschriebener
Pflichtrabatt
Umgangssprachlich für gesetzlich verordnete
Abschläge (z. B. Herstellerabschlag), die
Hersteller ohne Verhandlung gewähren
müssen.
ATC-Codes der Wirkstoffgruppen
Das ATC-System (Anatomisch-Therapeutisch-Chemische Klassifikation) ist das
amtliche, weltweit einheitliche Ordnungsschema der WHO für Arzneimittelwirkstoffe.
Jeder Code steht für eine bestimmte Wirkstoffgruppe. Im Fact-Sheet dienen die Codes
dazu, Umsätze markenneutral einzelnen Cluster-Bereichen zuzuordnen.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
A10C Insuline und Insulin-Analoga Blutzuckersenkende Hormonpräparate zur
Diabetes-Behandlung.
A10P SGLT2-Hemmer
Moderne orale Diabetes-Medikamente, die
Zucker über den Urin ausscheiden; auch bei
Herz- und Nierenschwäche wirksam.
A10S GLP-1-Rezeptor-Agonisten
Injizierbare Diabetes- und Adipositas-
Wirkstoffe; wachstumsstärkste Gruppe im
Markt (z. B. Semaglutid).
B01 Antithrombotische Mittel Übergeordnete Gruppe der
Blutgerinnungshemmer.
B01F Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer
Moderne orale Gerinnungshemmer zur
Schlaganfall- und Thrombosevorbeugung (z.
B. Apixaban, Rivaroxaban).
L01G Monoklonale Antikörper
(Antineoplastika) Gezielt wirkende Krebs-Antikörpertherapien.
L01H Proteinkinasehemmer
Zielgerichtete Krebsmedikamente, die
tumorfördernde Enzyme blockieren;
wachstumsstärkste Onkologie-Gruppe.
L02B Hormonantagonisten
Krebstherapien, die hormonabhängiges
Tumorwachstum bremsen (z. B. bei Prostata-
oder Brustkrebs).
L04B / L04C Immunsuppressiva /
Immunmodulatoren
Wirkstoffe gegen überschießende Immun- und
Entzündungsreaktionen (z. B. bei Rheuma,
Psoriasis).
N07A Mittel gegen Erkrankungen des
Nervensystems
Im Fact-Sheet konkret die Wirkstoffe gegen
Multiple Sklerose (MS).
Wirkstoffklassen und medizinische Fachbegriffe
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
Anti-TNF TNF-alpha-Inhibitoren
Biologika, die den Entzündungsbotenstoff
TNF-alpha blockieren (z. B. bei Rheuma,
Morbus Crohn).
ARNI Angiotensin-Rezeptor-Neprilysin-
Inhibitor
Kombinationswirkstoff zur Behandlung der
Herzschwäche (Sacubitril/Valsartan).
Biologika Biotechnologisch hergestellte
Arzneimittel
Aus lebenden Zellen gewonnene, komplexe
Wirkstoffe (z. B. Antikörper) – häufig bei Krebs
und Autoimmunerkrankungen.
BTK-Inhibitoren Bruton-Tyrosinkinase-Inhibitoren Zielgerichtete Wirkstoffe gegen bestimmte
Blutkrebsarten.
CD38-Antikörper Antikörper gegen das
Oberflächenmerkmal CD38
Krebstherapie, v. a. beim multiplen Myelom
(Knochenmarkkrebs).
CDK-Inhibitoren Cyclin-abhängige-Kinase-
Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Wirkstoffe, u. a. beim
Brustkrebs.
CGRP-Antagonisten Calcitonin-Gene-Related-Peptide-
Antagonisten
Moderne Migräne-Wirkstoffe; eine der fünf
Pilotgruppen für Rabattverträge.
Checkpoint-Inhibition Immun-Checkpoint-Hemmung Krebs-Immuntherapie, die die körpereigene
Immunabwehr gegen Tumorzellen „entfesselt“.
EGFR-Inhibitoren Epidermal-Growth-Factor-
Receptor-Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebstherapie, u. a. bei
Lungenkrebs.
Faktor-Xa-Hemmer Direkte orale Antikoagulanzien Blutgerinnungshemmer zur Schlaganfall- und
Thrombosevorbeugung (siehe ATC B01F).
GLP-1-Agonisten GLP-1-Rezeptor-Agonisten Diabetes- und Adipositas-Wirkstoffe (z. B.
Semaglutid, Tirzepatid); siehe ATC A10S.
HFrEF / HFpEF Herzinsuffizienz mit reduzierter /
erhaltener Pumpfunktion
Zwei medizinische Formen der
Herzschwäche.
Interleukin-Inhibitoren Hemmstoffe von Interleukinen
Biologika, die entzündungsfördernde
Botenstoffe (Interleukine) blockieren (z. B. bei
Psoriasis).
JAK-Inhibitoren Januskinase-Inhibitoren
Niedermolekulare (Tabletten-)Wirkstoffe gegen
Autoimmunerkrankungen; eine der fünf
Rabattvertrags-Pilotgruppen.
MAB Monoklonale Antikörper
Im Labor hergestellte, hochspezifische
Antikörper (Wortendung „-mab“, z. B. bei
Krebs).
MS Multiple Sklerose Chronisch-entzündliche Erkrankung des
zentralen Nervensystems.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
PARP-Inhibitoren Poly-ADP-Ribose-Polymerase-
Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebstherapie (u. a. Eierstock-,
Brustkrebs); eine der fünf Rabattvertrags-
Pilotgruppen.
PCSK9-Inhibitoren PCSK9-Hemmer
Cholesterinsenker zur Vorbeugung von Herz-
Kreislauf-Ereignissen; eine der fünf
Rabattvertrags-Pilotgruppen.
PD-1 / PD-L1-
Inhibitoren
Programmed-Cell-Death-(Ligand)-
Inhibitoren
Zentrale Krebs-Immuntherapien (Checkpoint-
Inhibitoren); eine der fünf Rabattvertrags-
Pilotgruppen.
Proteinkinasehemmer Kinase-Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebsmedikamente, die
tumorfördernde Enzyme blockieren (siehe
ATC L01H).
SGLT2-Hemmer Natrium-Glucose-Cotransporter-2-
Hemmer
Diabetes-Wirkstoffe mit Zusatznutzen bei
Herz- und Nierenschwäche (siehe ATC A10P).
Einheiten und sonstige Abkürzungen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
DDD Defined Daily Dose (definierte
Tagesdosis)
Statistische Vergleichseinheit für verordnete
Arzneimittelmengen.
F&E Forschung und Entwicklung Ausgaben für die Erforschung und
Entwicklung neuer Arzneimittel.
Mrd. € Milliarden Euro
Mio. € Millionen Euro
p. a. per annum (pro Jahr)
Q1–Q4 Quartale 1 bis 4 eines Jahres
Verteilung des GKV-Umsatzes nach Erkrankungsschwere (2025)
Das GKV-BStabG belastet ausgerechnet den Marktteil am stärksten, der die Versorgung Schwerstkranker sichert und die forschungs- und investitionsstärkste Industrie Deutschlands trägt.6F
Die vier Therapie-Cluster (Datenbasis 2025)
Übersicht: Cluster-Umsätze im GKV-Markt 2025
Cluster Onkologie & Immuntherapien
Cluster Autoimmun- & entzündliche Erkrankungen
Cluster Diabetes & Stoffwechsel
Cluster Herz-Kreislauf & Thrombose
Die pharmarelevanten Maßnahmen des GKV-BStabG
(Dynamischer) Herstellerabschlag (§ 130a Abs. 1b SGB V-E)
Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
(§ 130e SGB V-E, neu)
Preis-Mengen-Regelung
Kumulative Wirkung der Maßnahmen
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel und die Preis-Mengen greifen gleichzeitig und übereinander in die Innovationscluster Onkologie, Autoimmun, Diabetes und Herz-Kreislauf ein. Diese kumulierenden Effekte werden sich un...
Mehrfachbelastung je Cluster
Zwei exemplarische Beispiele wie sich die Kumulation finanziell auswirken wird am Beispiel des statischen Herstellerabschlages
Einordnung und Methodik
Gesetze und Paragrafen
Institutionen, Verbände und Datenquellen
Sparmaßnahmen und Begriffe der Preisregulierung
ATC-Codes der Wirkstoffgruppen
Wirkstoffklassen und medizinische Fachbegriffe
Einheiten und sonstige Abkürzungen
02.07.2026
Datei
11059/26 1
LIFE.5 EN
Council of the
European Union
Brussels, 30 June 2026
(OR. en)
11059/26
SAN 517
PHARM 117
MI 699
MAP 143
POLCOM 237
IND 447
COMPET 836
CODEC 1303
Interinstitutional File:
2025/0102 (COD)
OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS
From: General Secretariat of the Council
To: Delegations
No. prev. doc.: 10713/26
Subject: Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND
OF THE COUNCIL laying a framework for strengthening the availability
and security of supply of critical medicinal products as well as the
availability of, and accessibility of, medicinal products of common interest,
and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795
- Letter to the Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Public
Health
Following the Permanent Representatives Committee meeting of 30 June 2026 which endorsed the
final compromise text with a view to agreement, delegations are informed that
the Presidency sent the attached letter, together with its Annex, to the Chair of the European
Parliament Committee on Public Health.
11059/26 2
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
ANNEX
11059/26 3
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
PE-CONS No/YY - 2025/102(COD)
REGULATION (EU) 2026/…
OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of …
establishing a framework to strengthen the security of supply and the availability of critical
medicinal products, as well as the availability ▌ and accessibility of ▌ medicinal products of
common interest, and amending Regulation (EU) 2024/795
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114
thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,
After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,
Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee1,
Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure2,
1 OJ C ▌, C/2025/4214, 20.8.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4214/oj.
2 Position of the European Parliament of … [(OJ …)/(not yet published in the Official
Journal)] and position of the Council at first reading of … [(OJ …)/(not yet published in
the Official Journal)]. Position of the European Parliament of … [(OJ …)/(not yet
published in the Official Journal)] [and decision of the Council of …].
http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/4214/oj
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Whereas:
(1) Availability of critical medicinal products is essential for the Union and the functioning
of the internal market. Pursuant to Article 9 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (‘TFEU’) and Article 35 of the Charter of fundamental Rights of the
European Union ▌, the Union is to ensure a high level of human health protection in all
Union policies and activities. The availability of safe, efficacious and high-quality
medicinal products, underpinned by resilient, secure and reliable supply chains forming
the backbone of the supply of medicinal products, is vital for achieving this objective and
▌safeguarding public health across the Union while contributing to the Union’s overall
security. To safeguard the functioning of the internal market it is therefore necessary to
create a common Union framework to collectively address the challenges by
strengthening the security of supply and the availability of critical medicinal products.
(2) In recent years, the Union has experienced an increasing number of shortages of medicinal
products, including shortages of medicinal products for which insufficient supply affects
the continuity of care and the operational capacity of health systems and results in
serious harm or risk of serious harm to patients. In addition, the shortages of older
antibiotics, whose unavailability results in the necessity to substitute them, can
contribute to the increase of antimicrobial resistance. A stable and resilient supply of
critical medicines is therefore critical to the health of patients in the Union and the
proper functioning of health systems.
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(3) Shortages of medicinal products can have very different and complex root causes, with
challenges identified along the entire pharmaceutical value chain which differ depending
on the specific characteristics of the supply chains of medicinal products. In particular,
shortages of medicinal products can result from supply chain disruptions and
vulnerabilities affecting the supply of active substances and key inputs, including starting
and raw materials. These include existing dependencies on a limited number of suppliers
globally and lack of Union capacities to produce certain medicinal products, their active
substances or key inputs. Through diversification of supply sources and investment in
local production, the Union can reduce its risk of exposure to shortages of medicinal
products. In cases of blood-derived and plasma-derived medicinal products, the
vulnerabilities can also result from limited collection capacity and unavailability of
donors.
(4) Industrial challenges and a lack of investments in manufacturing capacities in the Union
have contributed to increased dependency on third country suppliers, in particular, for key
starting materials and active substances. Developing manufacturing capacity throughout
the supply chain requires substantial long-term investment in adequate industrial
infrastructure, strong research capabilities, regulatory predictability and a skilled
workforce. Setting up new manufacturing capacities in the Union for critical medicinal
products, their key inputs and active substances, and expanding or modernising existing
manufacturing capacities ▌ for those critical medicinal products, their key inputs and
active substances, which have often been on the market for a long time and are considered
to be relatively inexpensive, is currently not seen as a sufficiently attractive option for
private investment, also in view of lower energy costs, and less environmental and other
legal requirements elsewhere in the world. Workforce shortages and the need for
specialised skills in pharmaceutical manufacturing further add to the industrial challenges
to manufacturing in the Union. Targeted financial incentives, simplified administrative
processes, and better Union-level coordination can contribute to supporting efforts to
increase manufacturing capacities in the Union and strengthen the supply chains for critical
medicinal products.
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(4a) While medicinal products shortages can occur for any type of medicinal product, they
often affect older, off-patent, and generic medicinal products, partly due to their low
profit margins, which reduce incentives for investment in robust manufacturing
capacity. Older, off-patent, and generic medicinal products make up the majority of the
medicinal products placed on the Union list of critical medicinal products established by
Regulation (EU) .../...3+. Many off-patent and generic medicinal products suppliers have
outsourced manufacturing or relocated production of finished medicinal products
outside the Union, and frequently source their active substances from third countries.
Consequently, the Union relies on a limited number of active substance suppliers and
manufacturers, many located outside its borders.
(5) To enhance the security of supply for medicinal products and thereby contribute to a high
level of public health protection, the Union has implemented a range of measures that
contribute to building a European Health Union. In particular, Regulation (EU) 2022/123
of the European Parliament and of the Council4 has reinforced the European Medicines
Agency’s (‘the Agency’) mandate by enhancing monitoring, coordination, and reporting
mechanisms to prevent and mitigate supply disruptions of critical medicinal products
across Member States. That Regulation also established the Agency’s Executive Steering
Group on Shortages and Safety of Medicinal Products (‘the MSSG’), which brings
together representatives from the Agency and Member States, to coordinate urgent actions
within the Union to manage existing shortages and issues related to the quality, safety ▌
and efficacy of medicinal products.
3 Regulation (EU) …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … laying
down Union procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for
human use and establishing rules governing the European Medicines Agency, amending
Regulations (EC) No 1394/2007 and (EU) No 536/2014 and repealing Regulations (EC)
No 141/2000, (EC) No 726/2004 and (EC) No 1901/2006.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
4 Regulation (EU) 2022/123 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 January
2022 on a reinforced role for the European Medicines Agency in crisis preparedness and
management for medicinal products and medical devices (OJ L 20, 31.2.2022, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/123/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/123/oj
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(6) In addition, Regulation (EU) …/… +further strengthens the continuity of supply and
availability of medicinal products, inter alia by developing the core tasks already granted
to the Agency by Regulation (EU) 2022/123 and setting out a framework for the activities
to be deployed by the Member States and the Agency to improve the Union capacity to
react efficiently and in coordinated manner to support the shortages management and
security of supply of medicinal products, including by strengthening the obligations of
marketing authorisation holders with regard to shortages prevention and shortages
reporting or by establishing a Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for medicinal products
that allows a Member State affected by a critical shortage of a medicinal product to
request supplies from other Member States.
(7) However, despite regulatory obligations on marketing authorisation holders to ensure the
continuous supply of medicinal products to meet patients’ needs and the additional
regulatory mechanism introduced by Regulations (EU) 2022/123 and (EU) …/… + to
mitigate and respond to shortages, the functioning of the market dynamics alone does not
always guarantee the availability of medicinal products. This risk is particularly evident in
cases of supply chain disruptions, especially when the supply of a given medicinal product
relies on a limited number of global suppliers and production facilities or where there is a
high dependency on a single or a limited number of third countries.
(8) As the Union market for medicinal products remains fragmented, there is a need for better
coordination between Member States to leverage in full the Union’s potential to strengthen
the security of supply of critical medicinal products and facilitate accessibility to other
products, without calling into question Member States’ responsibilities for the organisation
and delivery of health services and medical care. Uncoordinated national measures risk
disrupting the internal market, fail to address broader supply chain issues, and are
insufficient to resolve cross-border issues, including the Union's dependency on third
countries. The regulatory framework for medicinal products therefore needs to be
complemented by targeted actions providing for further harmonisation.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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(9) Some medicinal products of common interest which are key for the provision of adapted
care to patients, while not affected by supply security issues, might still not be available
and accessible to patients in some Member States, which results in inequalities in access
between patients in the Union. This might concern medicinal products for rare diseases,
antimicrobials, and other innovative, high-cost, or specialised treatments across various
therapeutic areas, such as oncology. Lack of access might be caused by a variety of
factors, including product or geographical demand market size, which can impact the
timely accessibility and availability of medicinal products in certain Member States. This
Regulation contributes to reducing inequalities among Member States, and to more
equitable access to medicinal products across the Union, so that patients enjoy the same
level of access regardless of their country of residence.
(9a) Because orphan medicinal products target rare and ultra-rare diseases and limited
patient’ populations, they would benefit from collaborative procurement that allows for
the aggregation of the demand of participating Member States. For this reason, those
medicinal products should qualify for such procurement procedures even where they are
not considered as medicinal products of common interest. To encourage early access
and availability in the Union of those medicinal products, certain advantages in the
permit-granting process should be also granted to their developers and manufacturers.
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(10) The smooth functioning of the internal market and a high level of protection of human
health should be ensured as regards medicinal products. This Regulation should aim to
complement other Union pharmaceutical legislation by providing for a harmonised
framework supporting Member States’ coordinated efforts to encourage investments in
new, modernised and existing manufacturing capacities for critical medicinal products, by
encouraging the strategic use of public procurement instruments by the Member States as
well as the coordination of the Member States’ approaches, including through leveraging
aggregated demand through Commission facilitated collaborative procurement procedures
of critical medicinal products and medicinal products of common interest, as well as by
providing a framework to increase coordination between Member States in relation to
contingency stock requirements. Due to the international dimension of the security of
supply, in particular taking into account that diversification of supply chains and an overall
increase of supply are elements of a solution for ensuring the security of supply,
international cooperation should be encouraged.
(11) The measures introduced by this Regulation are without prejudice to marketing
authorisation holders’ obligations, in particular under Directive (EU) …/… of the
European Parliament and of the Council 5+, Regulation (EU) …/… ++ and Regulation (EU)
2022/123, including the obligation to ensure sufficient supplies of medicinal products,
within the limits of their responsibility. These measures are aligned with the principles of
the internal market. This Regulation is without prejudice to Union competition law,
including antitrust, merger and State aid rules.
5 Directive (EU) 2026/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of … on the
Union code relating to medicinal products for human use, and repealing Directives
2001/83/EC and 2009/35/EC.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Directive in document ST 7106/26
(2023/0132(COD)).
++ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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(11a) Data made available to competent authorities in accordance with Regulation (EU)
2025/327 of the European Parliament and of the Council6 on the European Health Data
Space (EHDS) can contribute to the implementation of this Regulation.
(12) While the primary objective of this Regulation should be to improve the functioning of the
internal market by establishing a framework to strengthen the security of supply and ▌
the availability of critical medicinal products, as well as the availability and accessibility
of medicinal products of common interest, given that a lack of critical medicinal products
can affect the functioning of the economy as a whole, this Regulation should also support
the Union’s competitiveness by fostering a more stable and predictable market
environment, reducing administrative barriers, encouraging investment and supporting
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector. Ensuring the security of supply and availability of
critical medicinal products and the availability and accessibility of ▌ medicinal products of
common interest should moreover contribute to the Union’s preparedness, resilience, and
economic and overall security, including when cross-border supply chains risk being
disrupted, therefore supporting the Union’s strategic autonomy.
(13) Taking into account the different root causes of the availability issues affecting critical
medicinal products and medicinal products of common interest, some measures should
apply to critical medicinal products only.
6 Regulation (EU) 2025/327 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
February 2025 on the European Health Data Space and amending Directive
2011/24/EU and Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (OJ L, 2025/327, 5.3.2025, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/327/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/327/oj
11059/26 11
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(14) Ensuring the security of supply and the availability of critical medicinal products for
patients in the Union to safeguard public health, patients’ safety and the economic and
overall security of the Union is a strategic objective of the Union. To achieve this, it is
important that the Member States and the Commission work together to strengthen the
security of supply and continuous availability of critical medicinal products in the Union
through measures that take full advantage of the potential of the internal market. In this
effort, the Commission has an important role to support the coordinated efforts of the
Members States.
(15) A well-defined list of critical medicinal products is essential to ensure that the measures
are targeted, effective ▌ and proportionate. The ▌ medicinal products covered by this
Regulation are those for which insufficient supply results in serious harm or risk of serious
harm to patients. For this reason this Regulation should apply to critical medicinal products
on the Union list of critical medicinal products, as established by Regulation (EU) …/… +.
That list builds upon the experiences of the ▌ Agency and Member States’ agencies that in
2024 ▌ identified a list of 276 critical medicinal products.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
11059/26 12
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(16) To ensure that the measures are applied where justified and proportionate, it is necessary to
demonstrate that some measures address a vulnerability in the supply chains of critical
medicinal products while taking into account the distinctive characteristics of each
category of critical medicinal products' supply chain. This Regulation should rely on the
vulnerability evaluation performed for the purpose of the application of the general
pharmaceutical legislation pursuant to Regulation (EU) No …/… +. To detect a
vulnerability in the supply chains it is necessary to look at aggregated data across all
medicinal products authorised in the Union and containing the same active substance, route
of administration and formulation. Such an approach allows for the determination whether,
for a critical medicinal product with a given active substance, the Union is highly
dependent on a single or a limited number of third countries, or a limited number of sites,
for active substances, key inputs, or finished dosage forms.
(17) Certain projects can have a positive impact on security of supply as they increase the
Union’s manufacturing capacity for critical medicinal products and strengthen the
resilience of the Union’s supply chains. In order to encourage private investments in these
projects, the concept of strategic projects should be introduced. Given their role in ensuring
the Union’s security of supply for critical medicinal products and contribution to the
objectives of preserving public health and protection of patients’ interests, the relevant
permit-granting authority should consider strategic projects to be in the public interest. To
ensure their expedient implementation, national authorities should be provided with
adequate resources to ensure that the relevant permit-granting processes are carried out
without delay, making available, in particular, any form of accelerated procedures that
exists in applicable Union and national law, whilst upholding the highest social, health
and environmental standards. National authorities should consider, when possible, their
streamlining as well as enable digital submission of required information.
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ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
(18) The designated authority should assess whether a given project is a strategic project. To
offer real advantage to strategic projects as regards shortened permitting timelines, such
assessments should be provided swiftly, without undue delay. When justified by the
complexity of the project being the subject of an assessment, the timeline for an
assessment can take up to 20 days. In order to accelerate and facilitate their deployment,
strategic projects should benefit from streamlined administrative processes, priority status
in the context of permit-granting procedures and related dispute resolution procedures,
where such processes, status and procedures already exist in national law, as well as ▌
be offered targeted ▌ support. It is necessary that the strategic project relies on
continuous supply of energy and gas to be able to produce the critical medicinal
products. For this reason the Member States could consider the strategic projects as
‘protected customer’ in accordance with Regulation 2017/1938 of the European
Parliament and of the Council 7 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas
supply. The Member States should also give particular attention to small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) which should have a fair chance to initiate strategic projects. This
Regulation should be applied in a manner that guarantees fair and equal competition
among all market players, regardless of their size and ownership structure. In order to
ensure uniform conditions for the implementation of this Regulation in the Member
States, a standard template for a request for recognition of a strategic project should be
provided for by means of implementing acts. Implementing powers should be conferred
on the Commission. Those powers should be exercised in accordance with Regulation
(EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council8.
7 Regulation (EU) 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25
October 2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 (OJ L 280, 28.10.2017, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj).
8 Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16
February 2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for
control by the Member States of the Commission's exercise of implementing powers
(OJ L 55, 28.2.2011, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/182/oj
11059/26 14
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(18a) A project promoter should be able to request that their application for a permit is
granted the status of the highest national significance, if such a status exists in national
law, and be treated accordingly. National authorities are to grant the status of the
highest national significance to an application for a permit without prejudice to
obligations provided for in Union law.
(18b) A project promoter should be able to request that any dispute resolution procedure,
litigation, appeal and proceedings on judicial remedies related to the permit-granting
process, and the issuance of permits for a strategic project in the Union, is treated as
urgent if and to the extent to which national law provides for such an urgency
procedure.
(19) The production of medicinal products has environmental implications and might
negatively impact not only the environment itself but also human health. The
environmental assessments and authorisations required under Union law are an integral
part of the permit-granting process for strategic projects and an essential safeguard to
ensure that negative environmental impacts, including of a transboundary nature, are
prevented or minimised. However, to ensure that permit-granting processes for strategic
projects are predictable and timely, it should be possible to streamline the required
assessments and authorisations by the relevant authority, while not lowering the level of
environmental protection nor neglecting steps necessary for a proper assessment of
transboundary impacts in accordance with applicable law.
(19a) Acknowledging the importance of international cooperation in environmental matters,
this Regulation respects the obligations arising from the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Conventions. In particular, it is without prejudice to
the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus Convention, 1998),
as well as the UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention, 1991) and its Protocol on Strategic
Environmental Assessment (the Kyiv Protocol, 2003).
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ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
(20) Land use conflicts can create barriers to the deployment of strategic projects. The relevant
national, regional or local authority responsible for preparing zoning, spatial and land use
plans should consider whether to introduce in these plans, where appropriate, certain
provisions related to strategic projects. Those plans have the potential to help balance the
public interest and common good, decreasing the potential for conflict and accelerating the
sustainable deployment of strategic projects in the Union.
(21) Given the capital-intensive nature of pharmaceutical production, including the
establishment or expansion or modernisation of manufacturing sites for critical medicinal
products, active substances, and key inputs, targeted financial support can play a crucial
role in incentivising production within the Union. To strengthen the security of supply of
critical medicinal products, and where private investment alone is not sufficient, financial
support of investments in manufacturing capacity within the Union may be justified.
Member States should be able to prioritise financial support for strategic projects that
address specific vulnerabilities in the supply chains, while ensuring that such support
complies with the Union’s State aid rules. For this purpose, specific guidance to clarify the
application of Union State aid rules to assist the Member States has been provided by the
Commission services and will be updated as necessary.
(21a) In order to enforce the supply commitments from the manufacturing sites that have
received public support, it is important that all available legal instruments and tools are
used. This, in particular, includes enforcement of related clauses in grants or award
agreements, or activation, when justified, of funding recovery mechanisms in
accordance with the applicable law and contractual terms.
(21b) Where the export of critical medicinal products manufactured in the Union leads to a
critical shortage or a risk of a critical shortage, all available legal instruments are to be
considered to ensure availability of these products to patients in the Union. This includes
Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and the Council9.
9 Regulation (EU) 2015/479 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March
2015 on common rules for exports (OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 34, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/479/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2015/479/oj
11059/26 16
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(22) Financial Support for strategic projects could be provided by the Union under Union
programmes in line with the objectives and provisions set out in the respective
regulations establishing those programmes. In particular, strategic projects should be
able to benefit from access to existing Union funding instruments, including the
EU4Health Programme10, the Digital Europe Programme11 and Horizon Europe12
(relevant, for example, for active substances referred to in ▌ Regulation (EU) 2021/695),
as well as the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), when they fulfil the
criteria established in these instruments. Authorities in charge of the Union programmes
covered by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council13
(STEP) should in particular consider supporting strategic projects addressing a
vulnerability in the supply chains of critical medicinal products and therefore Regulation
(EU) 2024/795 should be amended.
(22a) The strategic projects that received public financial support specifically to strengthen the
security of supply of critical medicinal products should prioritise supplies to the Union
market and ensure, within the limits of their responsibilities, supplies that cover needs of
patients in the Member States where those critical medicinal products have been placed
on the market.
10 Regulation (EU) 2021/522 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March
2021 establishing a Programme for the Union’s action in the field of Health (‘EU4Health
Programme’) for the period 2021-2027, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 282/2014 (OJ L
107, 26.3.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/522/oj).
11 Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021
establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 (OJ L
166, 11.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/694/oj).
12 Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021
establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation,
laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU)
No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 (OJ L 170, 12.5.2021, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj).
13 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February
2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending
Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057,
(EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695,
(EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/522/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/694/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/695/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj
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(23) To allow for a more coordinated approach to financial support, it is appropriate that
Member States and the Commission exchange ▌ information on financial support to
strategic projects. As regards the strategic projects that have received Union funding, it is
important that the beneficiaries ▌ follow the relevant communication and visibility rules.
(23a) Since the strategic projects are located in the territory of the Union, any public financial
support provided to establish, increase, modernise the manufacturing capacity for
critical medicinal products, their active substances or key inputs, should be spent within
the Union.
(24) Given that public authorities or entities are the principal buyers of medicinal products for
the inpatient sector and that the public procurement of medicinal products is a powerful
tool to improve security of supply ▌, it is necessary to establish rules that promote
resilience of supply in public procurement procedures of critical medicinal products
falling within the scope of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council15 through integration of resilience requirements, as appropriate, in the process
of public procurement in accordance with this Directive, in particular through
application of award criteria favouring the most economically advantageous tender
(MEAT) that take into account the supply security and availability considerations. In
addition, to provide market predictability and support investment in the production of
medicinal products, procurement procedures under this Regulation are to, where
justified, include predictable quantities. Those commitments can serve as an incentive
for manufacturers to maintain or scale up production capacity, particularly for
medicinal products that are essential for public health but might not be commercially
attractive under standard market conditions.
15 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February
2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p.
65, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/oj
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(24a) In order to strengthen the resilience of supply chains for medicinal products and to
mitigate the risk of supply disruptions, procurement procedures carried out under this
Regulation should, where appropriate, allow for the award of contracts to multiple
suppliers for the same medicinal product. Such multi-winner procurement approaches
can promote diversification of supply, enhance security of supply, and ensure that
production capacity is distributed across different manufacturers and geographical
locations within the Union.
(24b) The resilience of supply is strengthened if diversified supply sources are available, as
diversification reduces a concentration of risk. Any dependence on only one supplier,
irrespective of whether established in the Union or outside the Union, threatens the
security of supply. Resilience requirements should therefore aim to support the
availability of alternative suppliers of active substances, but also should be able to relate,
inter alia, to stockholding obligations, timeliness of the delivery or management of the
supply chains. Contracting authorities in the Member States should retain flexibility to
decide the most relevant approach, given the market situation and their specific needs.
The resilience can be promoted throughout the procurement procedures, by integrating
those resilience requirements either in the selection criteria, technical specifications,
award criteria or in the contract performance clauses, depending on the market situation
and public health considerations. Active use of award criteria acknowledging quality
alongside price are essential levers.
(25) Across Member States, contracting authorities differ in their introduction and use of
resilience requirements in public procurement procedures, which lead to differentiated
practices. This could have a negative impact on the internal market as it creates obstacles
to cross-border participation and a lack of predictability for bidders. In order to avoid such
negative outcomes, the use of resilience requirements should be mandatory and a more
streamlined practice supported.
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(26) Where dependency on a single or a limited number of countries outside the Union is
threatening the security of supply, it is necessary to procure in a way that promotes
alternative supply options to ensure a high level of public health protection. For this
reason, and in order to support the diversification of suppliers, where a vulnerability
evaluation of critical medicinal product performed by the MSSG points to the
vulnerability resulting from a high level of dependency on a single or ▌ limited number of
third countries, ▌ the contracting authorities ▌ should apply the procurement requirements
that, while preserving competition, incentivise manufacturing in the Union. To ensure
flexibility necessary to accommodate different national procurement practices in the
Member States, the contracting authorities should be able to choose at least one from the
tools offered in this Regulation. Such procurement requirements could take the form of
award criteria relying on a scoring system that rewards the suppliers proportionally to
the volume of Union manufactured products offered and weighting attributed to
manufacturing in the Union that effectively incentivises it, with the possibility to provide
an extra reward for suppliers that offer more than 50 % of the contract volume
manufactured in the Union. In case contracting authorities consider several lots in the
procurement procedure, such requirements could also take form of technical
specifications reserving at least one lot, representing a significant percentage of the total
volume of the contract, to products manufactured in the Union. ▌
(26a) ▌ Member States’ responsibilities for the definition of their health policy and for the
organisation and delivery of health services and medical care, including the allocation of
financial resources, are to be respected, as referred to in Article 168(7) TFEU. The
contracting authorities should therefore retain the ability in exceptional cases, where
justified by ▌ considerations related to ▌ market circumstances or considerations related
to financing of health services, to adopt procurement approaches that differ from those set
out in this Regulation as long as they are in line with the Union’s international obligations.
11059/26 20
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(26b) Considering the complexity of the pharmaceutical value chain, the contracting
authorities, when assessing whether medicinal products and active pharmaceutical
substances have been manufactured in the Union, should be able to rely on claims and
evidence provided by the tenderers and should take into account manufacturing
steps that add the most value.
(26c) In order to incentivise investments in modernisation or establishment of new
manufacturing capacity in the Union for critical medicinal products for which a
vulnerability evaluation indicated a vulnerability resulting from the high level of
dependency on third countries, it is necessary that the industry operators have
predictable market conditions that would encourage investments. For this reason it is
important that the procurement requirements favouring manufacturing in the Union
apply as long as the medicinal product remains on the Union list of critical medicinal
products and is designated as vulnerable due to the high level of dependency and for a
minimum period of 5 years from the day of entry into force of the last implementing act
by which the medicinal product in question is specified as vulnerable due to the high
level of dependency.
(26d) The continuous availability of critical medicinal products is essential to preserve human
life and can be seriously threatened by the existence of a confirmed vulnerability of
supply to the Union, consisting of a high level of dependency on one or a few number of
third countries. The resilience requirements in procurement procedures aiming to
safeguard the availability of critical medicinal products should be applied subject to the
Union’s international commitments including the Government Procurement Agreement
in WTO and other relevant international agreements to which the Union is bound.
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(27) The application of procurement requirements in public procurement procedures should
take into account the specific market conditions and public health needs of each
procurement procedure, whilst bearing in mind the considerations related to affordability
of medicinal products. Certain procurement requirements might not be justified if they
result in disproportionate cost for procurers or discourage participation, leading to no bids,
or if no suitable tender or no requests to participate have been submitted in response to a
similar public procurement procedure launched by the same contracting authority in the
two years prior to the commencement of the planned new procurement procedure.
Contracting authorities can presume tenders whose price exceeds the contracting
authority’s budget, as determined and documented prior to the launching of the
procurement procedure, to be considered as tenders with disproportionate costs.
Similarly, certain requirements might not be justified where it is strictly necessary due to
reasons of extreme urgency brought about by events unforeseeable by the contracting
authority and where the circumstances invoked to justify extreme urgency are not
attributable to the contracting authority and make it impossible to comply with those
requirements in the specific context of a negotiated procedure without prior publication.
Such extreme urgency events can include major natural or public‑health emergencies
requiring immediate action to protect patients’ life and health. In all such cases, the
non-application of those requirements should be duly justified and exceptional.
▌
(29) The Commission should issue guidelines designed to support Member States and
contracting authorities in implementing and applying the resilience requirements in
public procurement, including the obligations to use resilience requirements and
requirements that favour critical medicinal products, or their active substances,
manufactured in the Union with a view to strengthening the security of supply. The
Commission should consult relevant stakeholders such as patients and consumer
organisations, healthcare professionals, public healthcare payers and marketing
authorisation holders, in the process of preparation of those guidelines.
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(30) The procurement of medicinal products is organised differently across Member States,
involving various actors. To strengthen the security of supply chains for critical medicinal
products, Member States should establish national programmes that promote the consistent
use of requirements in public procurement procedures by contracting authorities within
their territory. Such national programmes could also promote the consistent use of multi-
winner approaches where beneficial, based on a thorough market analysis. To ensure a
comprehensive approach, and considering that critical medicinal products are also relevant
for the outpatient sector where they are often not purchased through public procurement,
those national programmes can also encompass other measures to strengthen supply chain
resilience and sustainability through measures related to pricing and reimbursement, where
appropriate. The programmes should be shared with the Commission and the Critical
Medicines Coordination Group (CMCG), established by this Regulation, to facilitate the
exchange of best practices and coordination between the Member States. This cooperation
should enhance the overall effectiveness of the various measures put forward to secure the
supply of critical medicinal products, while respecting the principles of subsidiarity and
proportionality.
(30a) In order to ensure legal clarity and effective coordination at Union level, it is essential to
distinguish between the concepts of contingency stocks and national stockpile. Those two
concepts refer to different types of reserves, governed by distinct legal and operational
frameworks, and serving different purposes within the supply chain and public health
preparedness In the context of contingency stocks, Member States should be encouraged
to require that the economic actors requested to hold contingency stocks apply
sustainable measures that contribute to reducing waste and improving the efficient use
of available medicinal products in line with national law and national needs.
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(31) Some Member States impose obligations on marketing authorisation holders and other
economic operators in the pharmaceutical supply chain to healthcare providers and
patients to hold contingency stocks for the purpose of safeguarding the security of supply
of medicinal products within their territory. Contingency stocks are to be distinguished
from publicly owned national, regional or local stockpiling in order to anticipate and
manage a specific crisis. Contingency stocks requirements imposed by a Member State
can potentially have a ▌ negative impact on the internal market and result in
unavailability of the medicinal products concerned in other Member States. Any such
contingency stocks requirements are to take into account that any restriction to the free
movement of goods has to be justified, in accordance with the TFEU as interpreted by
the Court of Justice of the European Union. To avoid a negative impact on availability
of medicinal products, Member States should also, when introducing or changing
existing contingency stock requirements for any medicinal products, including when
determining the medicinal products covered, the size of required stocks and the timeline
for establishment of the stocks, take into consideration the principles of proportionality,
transparency and solidarity. ▌ Member States should give due consideration to
forthcoming Commission guidelines designed to facilitate the fulfilment of Member States’
obligations as regards compliance with the internal market and the free movement of
goods when proposing and defining contingency stock requirements ▌.
(31a) To support the identification of potential negative impacts of the national contingency
stock requirements, any Member State should notify the CMCG of its intention to impose
such requirements, as well as inform the CMCG of those requirements once adopted.
Such obligation should be without prejudice to the notification requirement under
Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council16. To support
transparency of Member States contingency stock requirements, the Agency should
provide an overview of the imposed contingency stock requirements.
16 Directive (EU) 2015/1535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9
September 2015 laying down a procedure for the provision of information in the field of
technical regulations and of rules on Information Society services (OJ L 241, 17.9.2015,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/1535/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2015/1535/oj
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(31b) It is important to fully leverage the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for medicinal
products to allow preventing negative consequences of critical shortages of critical
medicines to patients. Once the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for medicinal products
is activated, the MSSG should be able to request the data on the available stock of
critical medicinal products concerned, and if the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for
medicinal products does not result in a suitable option to address the request of a
Member State facing a shortage, the MSSG could issue recommendations.
(32) Availability and access disparities exist for critical medicinal products and medicinal
products of common interest throughout the Union, disproportionately affecting some
Member States. The collaborative procurement of critical medicinal products and of
medicinal products of common interest can be a powerful tool to improve their security of
supply and accessibility. The participation of the economic operators in collaborative
procurement procedures conducted pursuant to this Regulation should be voluntary.
(33) Directive 2014/24/EU ▌ provides for the possibility of procurement involving contracting
authorities from different Member States. Whereas it has been found helpful to make small
markets attractive for suppliers, thereby achieving better availability of medicinal products,
the implementation of that possibility is time- and resource-intensive, especially in the
procurement starting phase, and considered a limiting factor. To facilitate the deployment
of procurement initiatives involving contracting authorities from different Member States,
the Commission, when requested, should provide its assistance during the preliminary
phase of setting up such a procurement initiative. The Commission assistance should be
limited in time and should not concern the choices of procurement procedures, or of the
procurement requirements, selection of tenders or decision on inclusion of specific
contract elements. The involved Member States are able to agree to continue the
procedure without the Commission’s facilitation, including by agreement on another
facilitator in accordance with Directive 2014/24/EU. Any involved Member State can
withdraw from the procedure at any stage before the signature of the procurement
contract. Withdrawal by one Member State would not in itself affect the continuation of
the procedure by the remaining participating Member States, provided that the minimum
requirements under this Regulation are still met. Member States could specify that they
wish to conduct the cross-border procurement with candidate countries.
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(34) Taking into account experiences resulting from the implementation of joint procurement of
medical countermeasures pursuant to Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European
Parliament and of the Council18, and of COVID-19 vaccines ▌ pursuant to Council
Regulation (EU) 2016/36919 in the context of the EU Vaccines Strategy, and
acknowledging potential benefits that leveraging of several Member States demand in one
procurement procedure might have, Member States should be able to consider ▌
requesting the Commission to procure on their behalf, or in their name, where such
procurement could contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation.
(35) To ensure that the collaborative procurement on behalf or in name of the Member States
contribute to the achievement of the objectives of this Regulation, while fully respecting
the principle of subsidiarity, the Commission’s involvement ▌ should be limited to ▌ cases
where the conditions set out in the relevant Articles are met. For this reason, derogation
from Article 168(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament
and of the Council20 should be provided.
18 Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
November 2022 on serious cross-border threats to health and repealing Decision
No 1082/2013/EU (OJ L 314, 6.12.2022, p. 26, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj).
19 Council Regulation (EU) 2016/296 of 15 March 2016 on the provision of the emergency
support within the Union (OJ L 70, 13.3.2016, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/369/oj).
20 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23
September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ L,
2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2371/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/369/oj
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj
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(35a) It is not appropriate that the Commission conducts a collaborative procurement on
behalf of, or in the name of, the requesting Member States where it has substantiated
grounds to expect that the procedure will not contribute to the improvement of the
security of supply of critical medicinal products or the accessibility of medicinal products
of common interest, while at the same time contributing to their affordability, or where
there are substantiated concerns that the procedure could result in a restriction of
competition, a distortion of trade or discrimination against Member States that do not
participate in the initiative, or where the involvement of the Commission cannot be
justified in the light of the principles of utility, necessity and proportionality, and in this
context, concerns related to the efficient use of the Commission resources. The
Commission should therefore be able to refuse to conduct the procurement procedure on
these grounds.
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(36) In accordance with Article 168 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, the
Commission, when procuring on behalf or in the name of the Member States, is to act
only within the limits of the mandate given by the participating Member States. To
ensure transparency, legal clarity, and effective coordination, a structured agreement
between the Member States and the Commission should govern procurement procedures
under this Regulation that rely on an active Commission involvement. Such an agreement
should set out the division of responsibilities, decision-making processes, the information
to be shared as relevant to the procurement procedure, including information on Member
States’ participation in parallel negotiations through different channels in relation to the
same medicinal products or the same active substances as appropriate, and liability
provisions, ensuring a fair and efficient framework for participating Member States while
preventing market distortions and supply disruptions. This Regulation is without prejudice
to, and does not prevent the use of, joint procurement procedures established under
Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 ▌ for those critical medicinal products and other medicinal
products that also fall within the definition of medical countermeasures as set out in that
Regulation. ▌ This Regulation is without prejudice to Council Regulation (EU)
2022/237221 setting the framework of measures for ensuring the supply of crisis-relevant
medical countermeasures in the event of a public health emergency at Union level.
21 Council Regulation (EU) 2022/2372 of 24 October 2022 on a framework of measures for
ensuring the supply of crisis-relevant medical countermeasures in the event of a public
health emergency at Union level (OJ L 314, p. 64, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2372/oj).
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(37) In order to ensure a structured and coordinated approach, as well as a coherent
information exchange, to strengthen the security of supply of critical medicinal products,
collaboration between the Member States, as well as between the Member States and the
Commission, is required. To that end, the CMCG should be established to facilitate
effective coordination across the relevant policy areas. The CMCG should be composed of
a permanent representative with strategic expertise in medicinal products procurement
policies, industrial policy related to pharmaceuticals and public health. As necessary,
Member States should be able to appoint additional expert representatives to accompany
the permanent Member State representative in order to support the different tasks of the
CMCG. The Commission should be a member of the CMCG. To ensure structured
discussions, a representative of the Member States and a representative of the
Commission should co-chair. The Agency should have an observer status. The
representatives of relevant stakeholders, including industry and patients’ representatives,
could, at the discretion of the CMCG, be invited by the CMCG to meetings to provide
expertise or participate as observers, where this is relevant and appropriate. The
Commission should perform the functions of the secretariat of the CMCG.
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(38) To ensure coordinated implementation of this Regulation, the CMCG should enable
exchanges of information related to funding of strategic projects. The CMCG should also
facilitate the exchange of information on national programmes to promote best practices
and, where appropriate, voluntary cooperation on Member States public procurement
policies with regard to critical medicinal products. The CMCG should furthermore
facilitate discussions on ▌ collaborative procurement initiatives, exchanges on guiding
principles on contingency stock requirements, discussions on the need to prioritise the
vulnerability evaluation for specific critical medicinal products and serve as a forum for
discussion on other possible collaborative initiatives, such as reserving jointly a
manufacturing capacity for critical medicinal products, their active substances or key
inputs. The coordination work of the CMCG should be distinct from the work of the
MSSG established under Article 3 of Regulation (EU) 2022/123 and whose tasks are set
out in that Regulation (EU) 2022/123 and Regulation (EU) No …/… +. Whereas the
main tasks of the MSSG are to coordinate Union-level responses to actual or potential
shortages of medicinal products during public health emergencies or major events, to
monitor the supply and demand of critical medicines and to provide recommendations to
prevent or mitigate shortages and support the strengthening of security of supply of
critical medicinal products, the focus of the CMCG should be to facilitate coordination
of the measures envisaged in this Regulation creating the necessary conditions on
investments and public procurement coordination and collaboration to proactively
reduce dependencies and strengthen Union manufacturing capacity.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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(38a) In order to ensure the efficient use of resources and their sound management, as well as
the impact of public funding to support strategic projects, it is important that Member
States and the Commission establish channels for exchanging and coordinating on
relevant information. The CMCG should play a central role in facilitating such
exchanges between the Member States. The Commission should also provide the CMCG
with information on open calls intended to support the strategic projects under Union
funding instruments. Where applicable, further synergies should be ensured through
increased coordination at national level between CMCG members and Member States
representatives involved in the management of potentially relevant Union funding
(38b) The CMCG should facilitate discussions between interested Member States to explore
their interest in concluding joint reservation contracts of specific manufacturing
capacities. Whenever a joint reservation contract results in a necessity to increase or
modernise manufacturing capacity, such initiative should be recognised as a strategic
project and benefit from the advantages offered by this Regulation.
(39) The ▌ availability and security of supply of critical medicinal products is to be enhanced
through diversification of supply sources, including through access to alternative sources
of supply in third countries. Such access could be supported by existing international
▌agreements. In view of exploring the potential of mutually beneficial cooperation in the
area of critical medicinal products, the Commission could ▌ pursue new strategic
partnerships with third countries ▌, especially with candidate countries. In this context, the
Commission should assess ▌ what types of potential partnerships could be concluded with
the most relevant third countries. This should be done without prejudice to the prerogatives
of the Council under the Treaties.
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(40) To ensure the application of this Regulation, it is necessary that market actors make
available information to the competent authorities ▌ and the Commission. The national
competent authorities, the Commission or the Agency, as relevant, must therefore be able
to request, when necessary and avoiding duplication of information requests, the
information necessary for the application of this Regulation. Furthermore, existing data
infrastructures and databases should be fully leveraged in order to reduce reporting
burdens, and improve the efficiency of data exchanges between competent authorities
and stakeholders. Market actors should be able to indicate that the information has
already been provided and is available to the requesting authority. Information acquired
in the course of implementing this Regulation should be protected by the relevant Union
and national law. An appropriate level of confidentiality of sensitive business
information and data obtained should be ensured in accordance with applicable Union
and national law. In particular, the staff of the Commission and the national competent
authorities should not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them pursuant to
this Regulation where such information is covered by the obligation of professional
secrecy. This should also apply to the CMCG. Any obligations on sharing information
pursuant to this Regulation should not apply to data that concern the essential interests
of the Member States’ security or defence.
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(41) In order to ensure that this Regulation effectively meets its objectives, it is essential to
assess its implementation and impact over time. The Commission should carry out an
evaluation of this Regulation at the latest five years after its application and every five
years thereafter. That evaluation should include an assessment of the extent to which the ▌
objectives of this Regulation, as set out in Article 1, have been achieved, including its
impact on stakeholders, regulatory procedures, and market dynamics. The evaluation
should also include an assessment of the scope, functioning and efficiency of Article 18,
as well as of the coherence of the Regulation with developments within the field of
public procurement. In particular, the Commission’s evaluation should take into account
the views of Member States, market actors, contracting authorities and other relevant
stakeholders, ensuring that their feedback contributes to the continuous improvement of the
regulatory framework. The results of the evaluation should be presented to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions. In order to facilitate that evaluation, national authorities, market actors,
contracting authorities and other relevant stakeholders should provide relevant data and
information upon request to support the Commission’s assessment.
(42) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to improve the functioning of the internal
market by establishing a framework to strengthen the availability and security of supply of
critical medicinal products within the Union and to improve the availability and
accessibility of medicinal products of common interest through coordinated and targeted
action of Member States, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States acting
alone, but can rather, by reason of the scale of the action needed, be better achieved at
Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, as set out in Article 5 of the TFEU. In accordance with the principle of
proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is
necessary in order to achieve those objectives.
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HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Chapter I
General provisions
Article 1
Objectives and subject matter
1. The objective of this Regulation is to improve the functioning of the internal market by
establishing a framework to strengthen the security of supply and the availability of critical
medicinal products within the Union, thereby ensuring a high level of public health
protection, supporting the security of the Union and strategic autonomy and contributing to
patients’ safety. The objective of this Regulation is also to improve the availability and
accessibility of ▌ medicinal products of common interest where the functioning of the market
does not otherwise sufficiently ensure the availability and accessibility of those medicinal
products to patients, whilst giving due consideration to the ▌ affordability of those medicinal
products.
2. To achieve the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, this Regulation establishes a framework
to:
(a) facilitate, support and incentivise investments in new manufacturing capacity and
strengthen existing manufacturing capacity for critical medicinal products, as well
as their active substances and other key inputs in the Union, to increase the
resilience of the supply chains and to facilitate their sustainable availability to the
critical medicinal product producers;
(b) lower the risk of supply disruptions and strengthen availability by incentivising
supply chain diversification, reducing dependencies, in particular on third
countries, where these put the supply of critical medicinal products at risk, and by
fostering resilience in the public procurement procedures ▌;
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(ba) address shortages and strengthen availability of critical medicinal products by
facilitating coordination, transparency and solidarity among Member States with
regard to contingency stocks requirements;
(c) leverage the aggregated demand of participating Member States through
collaborative procurement procedures, and
(d) support the diversification of supply chains also by facilitating the conclusion of
strategic partnerships.
Article 2
Scope
1. This Regulation applies, with the exception of Article 21, to the critical medicinal products
listed in the Union list of critical medicinal products referred to in Article 137 of Regulation
(EU) …/… +. ▌
2. Articles 1, 21, 22 and 24, Article 26(2), point (c), and Article 26(5) also apply to medicinal
products of common interest. ▌
2a. Articles 1, 5 and 6, Article 8(1), point (c), Articles 12, 13 and 21, Article 22(1), point (b),
Article 22(1a) to (7), Article 24, Article 26(2), point (c), and Article 26(5) of this Regulation
also apply mutatis mutandis to orphan medicinal products and designated orphan
medicinal products, irrespectively of whether a given product is a critical medicinal product
as defined in Article 2, point (…), of Regulation (EU) …/… + or a medicinal product of
common interest as defined in Article 3, point (5), of this Regulation, as applicable.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)) and in the corresponding footnote the number, date of adoption and
publication reference of that Regulation, including its ELI number.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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Article 3
Definitions
For the purposes of this Regulation, relevant definitions laid down in Article 4 of Directive (EU)
…/… ++ and in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) …/… + shall apply. The following definitions shall
also apply:
▌
(2) ‘key input’ means an input material other than an active substance required in the
manufacturing process of a given medicinal product, including immediate packaging
materials, excipients, solvents, reagents and starting materials;
▌
(3a) ‘collecting’ means collection of substances of human origin, as defined in Article 3,
point (1), of Regulation (EU) 2024/1938 of the European Parliament and of the
Council22, or of substances of animal origin for the purpose of being used as a starting
material for critical medicinal products;
▌
(5) ‘medicinal product of common interest’ means a medicinal product, other than a critical
medicinal product, for which in three or more Member States the functioning of the market
does not sufficiently ensure the availability and accessibility to patients in the quantities
and presentations necessary to cover the needs of patients in those Member States;
++ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Directive in document ST 7106/26
(2023/0132(COD)).
22 Regulation (EU) 2024/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June
2024 on standards of quality and safety for substances of human origin intended for
human application and repealing Directives 2002/98/EC and 2004/23/EC (OJ L,
2024/1938, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1938/oj).
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(6) ‘vulnerability in the supply chains’ means risks and weaknesses within the supply chains
of critical medicinal products as evaluated in accordance with Article 136(1), point (b),
and Article 138(2), of Regulation (EU) …/… +;
(7) ‘vulnerability evaluation’ means the evaluation of the supply chains of critical medicinal
products as carried out in accordance with Article 136 and Article 138(2) of Regulation
(EU) …/… +
▌
(9) ‘contracting authorities’ means contracting authorities as defined in Article 2(1), point (1),
of Directive 2014/24/EU;
(10) ‘strategic project’ means an industrial project recognised as a strategic project by a
designated authority as referred to in Article 6 pursuant to the criteria set out in Article 5;
(11) ‘project promoter’ means any undertaking or consortium of undertakings developing a
strategic project;
(12) ‘permit-granting process’ means a process covering all relevant permits to build, expand,
convert and operate a strategic project, including building, chemical and grid connection
permits and environmental assessments and authorisations where those are required and
encompassing all applications and procedures;
(13) ‘innovative manufacturing process’ means a novel manufacturing process or
manufacturing technology, or novel application of an existing manufacturing technology,
including ▌ decentralised manufacturing, continuous manufacturing, yield improvements
or chemistry or biotechnology processes that contribute to the environmental
performance of the production, and use of Artificial Intelligence, platform technologies
or 3D technologies in manufacturing;
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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(13a) ‘contingency stocks requirement‘ means an obligation to hold stocks of certain
medicinal products, imposed by a Member State, by law, regulations or administrative
provisions, on marketing authorisation holders and other economic operators in the
supply chain of medicinal products to healthcare providers and patients, including
stockholding obligations in public procurement procedures;
(14) ‘Member States’ cross-border procurement’ means a procurement procedure initiated at
the request of Member States and involving contracting authorities from different
Member States pursuant to Article 39 of Directive 2014/24/EU;
(15) ‘procurement on behalf of or in the name of the Member States’ means a procurement
procedure initiated at the request of Member States and mandating the Commission to act
as a central purchasing body on behalf of, or in the name of, the requesting Member States,
as provided for in Article 168(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the
European Parliament and of the Council;
▌
(17) ‘supplier’ means the manufacturer or marketing authorisation holder of finished dosage
forms, or manufacturer of key inputs or active substances;
(18) ‘strategic partnership’ means a commitment between the Union and a third country,
group of third countries or international organisations to increase cooperation related to ▌
critical medicinal products and their supply chains, that is established through a non-
binding instrument and which facilitates beneficial outcomes for both the Union and the
relevant third country, group of third countries or international organisation;
(18a) 'resilience of supply' means the ability of the supply chain to maintain a continuous and
demand-oriented supply of medicinal products, active substances and key inputs in the
Union, even during disruptions or external shocks.
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Chapter II
Strengthening the Union’s security of supply
Article 4
Cooperation between Member States and the Commission
▌
2. The Member States and the Commission shall work together to strengthen the security of
supply and continuous availability of critical medicinal products in the Union through
measures that take full advantage of the potential of the internal market.
3. The Commission shall support the coordinated efforts of the Members States.
Chapter III
Enabling conditions for investment
SECTION I
CRITERIA AND PROCEDURE FOR THE RECOGNITION OF STRATEGIC PROJECTS
Article 5
Strategic Projects
A project located in the Union and related to creating, modernising or increasing manufacturing
capacity shall be recognised as a strategic project if it meets at least one of the following criteria:
(a) it creates or increases manufacturing capacity, including through new technologies and
innovative manufacturing processes, for one or more critical medicinal products or for
collecting or manufacturing their active substances;
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(b) it modernises an existing manufacturing site for one or more critical medicinal products or
their active substances to ensure greater sustainability or increased efficiency;
(c) it creates or increases manufacturing capacity for key inputs necessary for the
manufacturing of one or more critical medicinal products or their active substances;
(d) it contributes to the roll-out in the Union of a technology that plays a key role in enabling
the manufacturing of one or more critical medicinal products, their active substances or
key inputs.
Article 6
Recognition of Strategic Projects
1. Each Member State shall designate an authority (‘the designated authority’) that shall assess
▌ whether an industrial project meets at least one of the criteria set out in Article 5 and is
therefore recognised as a strategic project.
A Member State may designate more than one authority.
1a. In order for a project to be recognised as a strategic project, a promoter of an industrial
project shall request the designated authority to assess whether the project is a strategic
project. The request shall contain justification and relevant evidence related to the
fulfilment of at least one of the criteria set out in Article 5. The designated authority shall
provide its conclusion to the project promoter without undue delay and in any event no
later than 20 days after the receipt of the request.
1b. The submission of a request for a project to be recognised as a strategic project as provided
for in paragraph 1a does not preclude the promoter of the project from simultaneously
initiating application procedures with other authorities for the permits needed for the
project.
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2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission ▌ the designated authorities for the
purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article and Article 16(2).
3. The Commission shall provide a simple, accessible, and user-friendly webpage for project
promoters on which at least the following elements shall be clearly listed:
(a) the contact details and other relevant information on the tasks of Member States’
designated authorities;
(b) information on dedicated Union support for strategic projects; and
(c) a standard template for the project promoter’s request referred in paragraph 1a
available in all official languages of the Union.
3a. The Commission shall adopt implementing acts to provide for the standard template
referred to in paragraph 3, point (c), of this Article. Those implementing acts shall be
adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 30a.
4. Any other authority in the Member State ▌ that receives a request from a promoter
concerning Articles 8 to 14 shall rely on the decision of the designated authority pursuant to
paragraph 1 as to whether that given project is recognised as a strategic project ▌.
▌
SECTION II
FACILITATING ADMINISTRATIVE AND PERMIT-GRANTING PROCESSES
Article 7
Priority status of strategic projects
1. Strategic projects shall be considered as contributing to the security of supply of critical
medicinal products in the Union and, therefore, to be in the public interest.
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2. The Member States’ authorities shall ensure that the relevant permit-granting processes
related to strategic projects are carried out without delay, in particular by making available ▌
any form of accelerated procedures that exists in applicable Union and national law while
ensuring the quality and robustness of assessments.
2a. Member States shall take into account paragraph 1 for the purposes of identifying
‘protected customers’ as defined in Article 2, point (5), of Regulation 2017/1938 of the
European Parliament and of the Council 23.
Article 8
Administrative and technical support
1. Upon request of a project promoter, ▌ Member States' authorities shall provide to a strategic
project located on its territory ▌ the administrative support necessary to facilitate its timely
and effective implementation, including assistance in accordance with national law:
(a) with regard to the project promoter’s compliance with applicable administrative and
reporting obligations;
(b) with regard to informing the public, with the aim of increasing public acceptance of
the strategic project and, where relevant, facilitating the consultation of local
communities, organisations and social partners;
(c) to the project promoter along the permit-granting process.
2. When providing the administrative support and the assistance referred to in paragraph 1, the
Member State shall pay particular attention to small and medium size enterprises (SMEs),
small mid-cap enterprises (SMCs) and not-for-profit entities and, where necessary, establish
a dedicated channel for communication with them to provide guidance and respond to queries
related to the implementation of this Regulation.
23 Regulation 2017/1938 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October
2017 concerning measures to safeguard the security of gas supply and repealing
Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj.
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1938/oj
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Article 9
Request for granting the status of highest national significance
1. A project promoter may request that their application for a permit is granted the status of the
highest national significance, when such a status exists in national law, and be treated
accordingly.
2. National authorities shall grant the status of the highest national significance to an application
for a permit without prejudice to obligations provided for in Union law.
Article 10
Procedures relating to dispute resolution
A project promoter may request that any dispute resolution procedure, litigation, appeal and
proceedings on judicial remedies related to the permit-granting process and the issuance of permits
for a strategic project in the Union before any national courts, tribunals or panels, including with
regard to mediation or arbitration, where they exist in national law, is treated as urgent if and to the
extent to which national law provides for such an urgency procedure. The applicable rights of
defence of individuals or of local communities shall be respected during such urgency procedure.
The project promoter shall participate in such urgency procedures, where applicable.
Article 11
Regulatory and scientific support from competent authorities for medicinal products
1. Upon request of a project promoter, a Member State’s competent authority for medicinal
products shall provide regulatory support to a strategic project located on its territory, where
relevant. Such support shall include administrative support for obtaining the necessary
authorisations from the competent authority.
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The Member State’s competent authority shall prioritise inspections to verify compliance
with Good Manufacturing Practices ▌ for the approval of new and extended manufacturing
sites and for the modernisation of the manufacturing sites ▌ in the context of the concerned
strategic project. Where appropriate a Member State may refer the promoter to request the
dedicated advice and assistance by the European Medicines Agency (‘the Agency’) in
accordance with paragraph 2.
2. Upon request of a project promoter, the ▌ Agency ▌ shall provide dedicated advice to assist
project promoters developing projects relying on innovative manufacturing processes. Where
this advice includes aspects related to Good Manufacturing Practices, the Agency shall
involve the relevant national competent authority for medicinal products in the provision of
this advice.
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Article 12
Environmental assessments and authorisation
1. A project promoter may request, where the obligation to assess the effects on the environment
arises simultaneously from two or more of Council Directive 92/43/EEC24, Directive
2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council25, Directive 2001/42/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council26, Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council27, Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council28,
Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council29, Directive 2011/92/EU
of the European Parliament and of the Council30 or Directive 2012/18/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council31, that a coordinated or joint procedure fulfilling the
requirements of those Union legislative acts is applied. The application of the joint or
coordinated procedure shall not affect the content or quality of the environmental impact
assessment.
24 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and
of wild fauna and flora (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1992/43/oj).
25 Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (OJ L 327,
22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj).
26 Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on
the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (OJ L
197, 21.7.2001, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2001/42/oj).
27 Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November
2008 on waste and repealing certain Directives (OJ L 312, 22.11.2008, p. 3, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/98/oj).
28 Directive 2009/147/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November
2009 on the conservation of wild birds (OJ L 20, 26.1.2010, p. 7, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/147/oj).
29 Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November
2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334,
17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
30 Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the
environment (OJ L 26, 28.1.2012, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/92/oj).
31 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the
control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and
subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC (OJ L 197, 24.7.2012, p. 1, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/18/oj).
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Under the coordinated procedure referred to in the first subparagraph, a competent authority
shall coordinate the various individual assessments of the environmental impact of a
particular project required by the relevant Directive.
Under the joint procedure referred to in the first subparagraph, a competent authority shall
provide for a single assessment of the environmental impact of a particular project required by
the relevant Directive.
2. Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities issue the reasoned conclusion
referred to in Article 1(2), point (g)(iv), of Directive 2011/92/EU on the environmental impact
assessment within 60 days of receiving all necessary information.
3. In exceptional cases, where the nature, complexity, location or size of the proposed project so
requires, Member States may extend the time limit referred to in paragraph 2 once by a
maximum of 15 days, before its expiry and on a case-by-case basis. In that event, the
competent authority shall inform the project promoter in writing of the reasons justifying the
extension and of the deadline for its reasoned conclusion.
4. The deadlines for consulting the public concerned as referred to in Article 1(2), point (e), of
Directive 2011/92/EU and the authorities referred to in Article 6(1) of that Directive on the
environmental impact assessment report referred to in Article 5(1) of that Directive shall not
be longer than 85 days and not shorter than the 30 day period referred to in Article 6(7) of that
Directive.
5. With regard to the environmental impacts or obligations referred to in Article 4(7) of
Directive 2000/60/EC, Article 9(1), point (a), of Directive 2009/147/EC and Articles 6(4) and
16(1) of Directive 92/43/EEC, and for the purposes of Article 4(14) and (15) and Article
5(11) and (12) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1991, strategic projects in the Union may be
considered to have an overriding public interest and to serve the interests of public health and
safety provided that all the conditions set out in those acts are fulfilled.
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Article 13
Planning
1. National, regional and local authorities responsible for preparing plans, including zoning,
spatial plans and land use plans, shall consider including in such plans, where appropriate,
provisions for the development of Strategic Projects, as well as the necessary infrastructure.
To facilitate the development of strategic projects, Member States shall ensure that all
relevant spatial planning data are available and accessible.
2. Where plans including provisions for the development of strategic projects are subject to an
assessment pursuant to Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
and pursuant to Article 6(3) of Directive 92/43/EEC, those assessments shall be combined.
Where applicable, the combined assessment shall also address the impact on potentially
affected water bodies referred to in Directive 2000/60/EC. Where Member States are required
to assess the impacts of existing and future activities on the marine environment, including
land-sea interactions, in accordance with Article 4 of Directive 2014/89/EU of the European
Parliament and of the Council32, the combined assessment shall also cover those impacts. The
fact that assessments are combined pursuant to this paragraph shall not affect their
content, or quality or robustness of the assessment.
32 Directive 2014/89/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014
establishing a framework for maritime spatial planning (OJ L 257, 28.8.2014, p. 135, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/89/oj).
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Article 14
Applicability of UNECE Conventions
1. This Regulation is without prejudice to the obligations under the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation
in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, signed at Aarhus on 25
June 1998, and under the UNECE Convention on environmental impact assessment in a
transboundary context, signed at Espoo on 25 February 1991 and its Protocol on Strategic
Environmental Assessment, signed in Kyiv on 21 May 2003.
2. All decisions adopted pursuant to the Articles in this Section, to which the obligations under
the UNECE Convention apply, shall be made publicly available.
SECTION III
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
Article 15
Financial support by Member States
1. Without prejudice to Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU), Member States may prioritise financial support to strategic projects that
address a vulnerability in the supply chains of critical medicinal products identified following
a vulnerability evaluation and with due consideration to the strategic orientations of the
Critical Medicines Coordination Group (‘CMCG’) referred to in Article 26(2), point (a).
1a. The Commission shall facilitate the consistent application of this Article by providing
sufficient guidance to Member States on the possibilities offered under existing State aid
rules for the granting of State aid to strategic projects.
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2. For as long as the critical medicinal product is on the Union list of critical medicinal products,
an undertaking that has benefitted from financial support by a Member State for a strategic
project shall prioritise ▌ the Union market ▌ to ensure, within the limits of its
responsibilities, appropriate and continued supply so that the needs of patients are covered
and the critical medicinal product remains available in the Member States on whose market it
has been made available.
Where appropriate, the terms of the financial support shall stipulate for how long the
obligation to prioritise the Union market shall continue to apply in case the critical
medicinal product is removed from the Union list of critical medicinal products.
3. The Member State that provided financial support to a strategic project may require the
beneficiary undertaking to prioritise supply and provide the necessary supplies of a critical
medicinal product, active substance or key inputs, as applicable, to the Union market to avoid
shortages in one or more Member States.
Any other Member State that encounters a threat of shortages of the critical medicinal product
in question may request the Member State that provided financial support to submit a request
on its behalf. The beneficiary undertaking shall make best efforts to supply such products in
the requesting Member State.
Article 16
Financial support from the Union
1. Financial support for strategic projects under the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-
202733 may be provided by the Union from Union programmes, including, but not limited to,
the EU4Health Programme established by Regulation (EU) 2021/522, Horizon Europe
established by Regulation (EU) 2021/695, and the Digital Europe Programme established by
Regulation (EU) 2021/694, provided that such financial support is in line with the objectives
set out in the respective regulations establishing those programmes.
33 Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial
framework for years 2021 to 2027 (OJ LI 433, 22.12.2020, p.11, ELI:
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
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1a. Where a project promoter receives financial support for a strategic project from a Union
financial instrument which provides that funding may be made available under the
condition of strengthening the availability of critical medicinal products consistent with the
objectives of this Regulation, it shall prioritise supply to the Union market and shall ensure,
within the limits of its responsibilities, that the critical medicinal product remains available
in the Member States in whose market it has been made available.
2. Where the strategic project relates to critical medicinal products for which the vulnerability
evaluation has been concluded, at the request of a project promoter, justified by the necessity
to demonstrate that a strategic project addresses a vulnerability in the supply chains as
necessary for the purpose of an application of Union funding, the designated authority shall
verify whether a strategic project addresses a vulnerability in the supply chains identified
following the vulnerability evaluation. The designated authority shall provide the verification
to the project promoter within 15 working days of receiving the request. The designated
authority shall inform the Commission about the strategic projects identified as addressing an
existing vulnerability in the supply chains without delay.
Where the designated authority considers that the submitted particulars and documents
accompanying the request referred to in the first subparagraph are incomplete, it shall
inform the project promoter accordingly and shall set a time-limit for providing the missing
information and documents. In case the designated authority sets such a time-limit, the
time-limit referred to in the first subparagraph shall be suspended until the missing
information and documents required have been provided.
2a. A financial allocation may also be made available from the general budget of the Union.
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Article 17
Exchange of information on financial support for strategic projects
1. Member States shall, without prejudice to their right to decide whether to provide financial
support to strategic projects, inform the CMCG, referred to in Article 25, of the intention to
provide such financial support sufficiently in advance to enable the CMCG to carry out its
coordination task as set out in Article 26.
2. The Commission and Member States shall regularly inform the CMCG of the strategic
projects receiving financial support from the Union and Member States respectively to
enable the CMCG to carry out its coordination task.
2a. When informing the Critical Medicines Group pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2, Member
States shall include information on how the strategic projects concerned meet one or more
of the criteria listed in Article 5.
3. The Commission shall inform the CMCG about all open calls to support strategic projects.
It may inform the CMCG of its intention to propose the establishment of funding possibilities
and any other Union funding programmes that could benefit the availability of critical
medicinal products, under specific rules and conditions of those Union funding programmes.
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Chapter IV
Demand side measures
SECTION I
REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES AND RELATED MEASURES
Article 18
Incentivising resilience, sustainability and positive social impacts in public procurement procedures
1. For public procurement procedures of critical medicinal products falling within the scope of
Directive 2014/24/EU ▌, contracting authorities ▌ shall apply ▌ requirements that effectively
promote the resilience of supply in the Union for those critical medicinal products
('resilience requirements').
The resilience requirements shall support the diversification of supply sources of active
substances and, where applicable, medicinal products, including within the Union, and
reward reliable and compliant suppliers. In addition, the resilience requirements may, inter
alia, relate to stockholding ▌, ▌ timely delivery and management of the supply chains.
The resilience requirements shall be implemented by at least one of the following:
(a) selection criteria within the meaning of Article 58 of Directive 2014/24/EU; or
(b) technical specifications within the meaning of Article 42 of Directive 2014/24/EU;
or
(c) best price-quality ratio as contract award criteria within the meaning of Article 67
of Directive 2014/24/EU; or
(d) contract performance clauses within the meaning of Article 70 of Directive
2014/24/EU.
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2. For public procurement procedures of critical medicinal products for which a vulnerability
in the supply chains has been identified through a vulnerability evaluation pointing to the high
level of dependency on a single or a limited number of third countries, the contracting
authorities shall ▌ favour manufacturing of such medicinal products in the Union. ▌
To favour manufacturing of critical medicinal products in accordance with the first
subparagraph, the contracting authorities shall apply at least one of the following
mechanisms:
(a) use technical specifications within the meaning of Article 42 of Directive
2014/24/EU requiring that at least one lot representing at least 50 % percent of the
total volume covered by all lots is reserved for the suppliers offering the critical
medicinal product and its active substance manufactured in the Union when
applying multi-winner approaches in procurement procedures; or
(b) apply the best price-quality ratio as award criterion within the meaning of Article
67 of Directive 2014/24/EU and favour suppliers of critical medicinal products and
their active substances manufactured in the Union by applying a scoring that
proportionately rewards the share of manufacturing in the Union and by applying
a weighting that effectively achieves this objective. In this context, the contracting
authority may allocate additional points to the manufacturer who offers 50% or
more of the critical medicinal products and their active substances manufactured
in the Union.
The procurement requirements shall be applied in compliance with the Union’s
international commitments.
For the purpose of applying this paragraph, manufacturing in the Union shall include
manufacturing steps that are carried out within the Union other than import, repackaging,
packaging other than immediate packaging, labelling, quality testing and, where
applicable, certification.
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Evidence supporting the claim in tenders that the manufacturing is taking place in the
Union shall be provided where required by the tenderers, and supported by documents
facilitating the independent verification by the contracting authority.
2a. The procurement requirements referred to in paragraph 2 shall apply for as long as the
medicinal product remains on the Union list of critical medicinal products and is
designated as vulnerable due to the high level dependency and for a minimum period of 5
years from the date of entry into force of the last implementing act by which the medicinal
product in question is specified by the Commission as being vulnerable due to the high level
of dependency in accordance with Article 137(3) of Regulation (EU) …/…+.
3. For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, the contracting authorities ▌ shall consider, where
appropriate, multi-winner approaches.
4. This Article shall not preclude contracting authorities from using additional qualitative
requirements, including requirements related to environmental sustainability and social
rights.
5. Contracting authorities may exceptionally decide not to apply paragraphs 1, 2, 2a and 3 where
it is duly justified by market circumstances or considerations related to the financing of
health services, where:
(a) the required critical medicinal product can only be supplied by a specific economic
operator as defined in Article 2(1), point (10), of Directive 2014/24/EU and no
reasonable alternative or substitute exists, and the absence of competition is not
the result of an artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the public
procurement procedure;
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
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(b) no suitable tenders or no suitable requests to participate have been submitted in
response to a similar public procurement procedure launched by the same
contracting authority in the two years prior to the commencement of the planned
new procurement procedure;
(c) the application of paragraphs 1, 2, 2a and 3 would oblige the contracting authority
to acquire critical medicinal products having disproportionate costs; or
(d) in the context of a negotiated procedure without prior publication pursuant to
Article 32(2), point (c), of Directive 2014/24/EU.
5a. The justification for the exceptions referred to in paragraph 5 specifying the relevant
circumstances or considerations shall be documented in writing by the contracting
authority and be subject to verification and redress where relevant.
6. By ... [12 months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation], the Commission shall
issue guidelines designed to support Member States in implementing the obligations of this
Article and to facilitate the compliance with those obligations by contracting authorities.
Article 19
National programmes supporting ▌ resilience in public procurement procedures
1. By ... [12 months from the date of entry into force of this Regulation], each Member State
shall, with due respect to the organisation of the procurement of medicinal products within
the Member State, establish a national programme supporting security of supply of critical
medicinal products, including in public procurement procedures. Such programmes shall
promote the consistent use of procurement requirements by contracting authorities within a
given Member State as well as multi-winner approaches, where beneficial in light of the
market analysis. Such programmes may also include measures for pricing and reimbursement
supporting security of supply of those critical medicinal products that are not purchased
through public procurement procedures. Member States may involve their national pricing
and reimbursement authorities in the planning and evaluation of such programmes.
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2. Member States shall inform the Commission in its role of the secretariat of the CMCG about
their programmes. The Commission shall ensure the distribution to all members of the
CMCG forthwith. The CMCG shall facilitate a discussion, aiming to ensure coordination of
national programmes including as regards the application of the procurement requirements
referred to in Article 18(2) and may issue opinions. Where the CMCG issues an opinion
concerning the national programmes, Member States ▌ may take it into account when
revising their programmes.
Article 20
Safeguards related to Member States’ contingency stock requirements and other security of supply
measures
1. Contingency stock requirements applied in one Member State shall not result in any negative
impact in other Member States by respecting the principles referred to in paragraph 2 of this
Article.
Member States shall, in particular, avoid such an impact when proposing and defining the
scope and timing of any form of requirements for companies to hold contingency stocks.
2. Member States shall ensure that any contingency stock requirements, including the
implementation timeline, they impose on economic operators in the supply chain, are
targeted and respect the principles of proportionality, transparency and solidarity.
2a. This Article is without prejudice to obligations under Union law for the notification of
technical regulations and technical barriers to the internal market, including those laid
down in Directive (EU) 2015/1535.
2b. All contingency stock requirements and other security of supply measures shall be
implemented in a way that aims to minimise waste of medicinal products through effective
stock rotation based on the ‘first expired, first out’ system to prevent the destruction of
medicinal products.
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2c. The Commission shall, following a consultation with relevant stakeholders, including
patient and consumer organisations, healthcare professional organisations, public
healthcare payers, and industry representatives, issue Union guidelines for contingency
stocks. Those guidelines may include:
(a) best practices, reviewed regularly, for the setting of contingency stocks;
(b) recommended strategies for timely deployment of contingency stocks, including
labelling and packaging arrangements;
(c) best practices on sustainable contingency stock management and disposal of
medicinal products.
Article 20a
Information sharing and reporting on contingency stock requirements
1. Member States shall, without prejudice to their right to decide to impose contingency stock
requirements, inform the CMCG of their intention to impose such requirements or make
significant changes to such existing requirements, and inform of any such requirements
once imposed or of any such changes once made, for the purpose of transparency and to
enable exchanges on the guiding principles of proportionality and solidarity referred to in
Article 20(2).
2. This Article is without prejudice to obligations under Union law for the notification of
technical regulations and technical barriers to the internal market, including those laid
down in Directive (EU) 2015/1535.
3. The Agency shall establish and maintain a digital platform which provides an overview of
contingency stock requirements imposed by national law including which critical medicinal
products are covered and the size of required stocks.
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4. Where The European Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for medicinal products is activated
in accordance with Article 131 of Regulation (EU) …/… +, Member States shall, where
reasonably possible within their national monitoring systems, upon request from the
MSSG, provide up-to-date stock data relating to critical medicinal products subject to
contingency stock requirements, which a Member State identifies as available for
reallocation.
5. Where the activation of the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism for medicinal products has not
resulted in a suitable option to address that request, the MSSG may, at the request of the
Member State that activated that Mechanism, issue a recommendation to Member States
with the aim of facilitating contributions by marketing authorisation holders to that
Mechanism.
Such recommendation may, where appropriate, invite Member States to consider
suspending or adapting contingency stock requirements and related enforcement measures,
in order to enable the supply of the concerned critical medicinal product to Member States
facing a shortage and ensuring an optimal allocation of critical medicinal products
between the Member States.
6. Article 29a(4) shall apply to any information sharing and reporting under this Article.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)) and in the corresponding footnote the number, date of adoption and
publication reference of that Regulation, including its ELI number.
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SECTION II
VOLUNTARY COLLABORATIVE PROCUREMENTS
Article 21
Commission facilitated Member States’ cross-border procurement
1. Upon a reasoned request from three or more Member States (‘the request’), the Commission
may act as facilitator for the requesting Member States’ cross-border procurement as laid
down in Article 39 of Directive 2014/24/EU34 where the procurement concerns medicinal
products of common interest.
2. Having received the request, the Commission shall inform all other Member States of the
request, through the CMCG, and set ▌ a deadline of 4 weeks for Member States to declare
their interest in participating in the procedure.
3. The Commission shall assess the request in light of the objectives of this Regulation. The
Commission shall inform the interested Member States of its decision on whether it agrees ▌
to facilitate the proposed request within 15 working days following expiry of the deadline
specified in paragraph 2.
4. Where the Commission declines the request, it shall state its reasons for the refusal.
5. Where the Commission accepts the request, the Commission shall provide secretarial and
logistical support to the participating Member States. The Commission shall facilitate
communication and cooperation between the ▌ Member States and provide advice on
applicable Union public procurement rules, including on the use of procurement
requirements as set out in Article 18 and on regulatory matters related to medicinal products.
34 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, p. 65,
ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/24/2024-01-01 ).3
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6. The facilitation offered by the Commission shall be limited in time and shall end at the latest
upon signature of the procurement contract by the participating contracting authorities.
Member States participating in the cross-border procurement shall procure at their cost
only.
7. The Commission shall not be responsible, nor held liable, for any breaches of Union or
national procurement laws by the participating contracting authorities. The Commission shall
bear no liability associated with the conduct of the procurement procedure by participating
Member States or for the implementation of the contract resulting from the procedure.
7a. Member States may specify that they wish to conduct the cross-border procurement as
referred to in paragraph 1 with those candidate countries that choose to participate in the
procedures established herein and with which the Union has entered into a bilateral
agreement thereof, without prejudice to their accession negotiations or to the rights and
obligations reserved to Member States under Union law. The participation of candidate
countries shall not affect the need for three or more Member States to initiate the
procedure.
Article 22
Commission procurement on behalf of or in the name of Member States
1. By way of derogation from Article 168(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509, where
five or more Member States jointly request the Commission to procure on their behalf ▌ or in
their name and at their costs (`the joint request`), the Commission shall, unless it provides
substantiated reasons not to initiate the procurement procedure, initiate such a procedure
under the conditions laid down in this Article when the procurement concerns medicinal
products belonging to one of the following categories:
(a) critical medicinal products for which a vulnerability evaluation has identified a
vulnerability in the supply chains or for which the MSSG has recommended a
common procurement initiative;
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(b) medicinal products of common interest, for which a joint clinical assessment report
has been published pursuant to Article 12(4) Regulation 2021/2282/EU 18, or which
have undergone a clinical assessment carried out under the voluntary cooperation
among Member States pursuant to Article 23(1), point (e), of that Regulation.
1a. The Commission may, on its own initiative, invite Member States to submit a joint request
in accordance with paragraph 1.
2. The joint request referred to in paragraph 1 shall only be submitted where the medicinal
product concerned fulfils one of the criteria laid down in that paragraph and where the
requested procurement procedure is expected to improve the security of supply and
availability of critical medicinal products in the Union or to ensure the availability and
accessibility and contribute to affordability of medicinal products of common interest, as
applicable.
3. The participation in the procurement procedure shall be open to all Member States. Having
received the joint request, the Commission shall inform all other Member States of the joint
request, through the CMCG, and set a deadline of four weeks for Member States to express
their interest in participating in the procedure.
4. The Commission shall assess ▌ whether the joint request is justified in light of the objectives
of this Regulation. The Commission shall in particular verify whether the procurement could
result in discrimination or restriction on trade or a distortion of competition taking into
account the utility, necessity and proportionality of the joint request.
5. Within 15 working days following expiry of the deadline in paragraph 3, the Commission
shall communicate to the interested Member States ▌ its decision and state its reasons in case
of a refusal.
11059/26 61
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
5a. The procurement procedures under this Article shall apply, where relevant, resilience
requirements equivalent to those set out in Article 18. Those requirements shall be specified
in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 and specified in the mandate
given by the participating Member States to the Commission within the meaning of Article
168(3) of that Regulation.
6. The initiation of the procurement procedure by the Commission shall be conditional upon
the interested Member States accepting binding minimum quantities, in accordance with
their national need, and may be conditional, if necessary ▌ in order to achieve the objectives
of this Regulation, upon the interested Member States refraining from participating in
competing subsequent procurement processes. Such a procurement procedure may only be
initiated once these conditions have been accepted by the interested Member States.
7. Except for the derogations provided for in this Regulation, the procurement referred to in this
Article shall be carried out in accordance with Article 168(3) of Regulation (EU, Euratom)
2024/250935.
▌
Article 24
Agreement concerning procedures under Article 22
1. Member States participating in the procurement procedures under Article 22 shall share with
the Commission any information relevant for the procurement procedure. The participating
Member States shall provide the resources necessary for the successful conclusion of the
procedure, in particular through involvement of staff with expertise and knowledge.
35 Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union
(recast) (OJ L, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj).
11059/26 62
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
2. An agreement between the Member States and the Commission shall determine the practical
arrangements governing the procurement procedure, liabilities to be assumed and the
decision-making process. The procedure shall be carried out in accordance with the
mandate given by the Member States to the Commission as required by Article 168(3) of
Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509.
Chapter V
Critical Medicines Coordination Group
Article 25
Establishment of Critical Medicines Coordination Group
1. A Critical Medicines Coordination Group (‘CMCG’) is hereby established.
2. The Member States and the Commission are Members of the CMCG. Each Member State
shall appoint one permanent representative, with strategic expertise relevant for
implementing ▌ the different measures set out in this Regulation. As necessary, Member
States may appoint an alternate permanent representative and additional expert
representatives to accompany the permanent Member State representative in order to
support the different tasks of the CMCG. The Agency shall have an observer status.
The representatives of relevant stakeholders, including industry and patients’
representatives, may, at the discretion of the CMCG, be invited to meetings to provide
expertise or participate as observers, where this is relevant and appropriate.
2a. The representatives appointed to the Critical Medicines Group and its working group or
working groups shall make a declaration of their financial and other interests and update it
annually and whenever necessary.
11059/26 63
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
3. The CMCG shall work closely with the MSSG, the Agency ▌ and national competent
authorities ▌ for medicinal products. For discussions where input from national regulatory
authorities responsible for medicinal products is necessary, the CMCG and the MSSG may
organise joint meetings. To fulfil its tasks, the CMCG shall, where relevant, also consult
through joint meetings with patient and consumer organisations, healthcare professional
organisations and industry representatives.
4. The Commission, acting as the Secretariat of the CMCG, shall organise regular meetings
and coordinate the work of the CMCG. The CMCG shall establish its rules of procedure,
including procedures relating to the working group referred to in paragraph 6.
5. The CMCG shall be co-chaired by a representative of the Commission and by a
representative of the Member States, who shall be elected by and from among the
representatives of the Member States.
6. The CMCG, at the proposal of the co-chair or any of its members, may, on a case-by-case
basis, decide to establish one or more working groups.
7. The CMCG shall use its best endeavours to reach consensus, where possible, when providing
advice as referred to in Article 26(1), when providing recommendations as referred to in
Article 26(2), point (d), and when providing an opinion as referred to in Article 26(5). If
such consensus cannot be reached, the CMCG shall issue its position by a majority of two-
thirds of its members. Each Member State shall have one vote. Members with diverging
positions may request that their positions and the grounds on which they are based be
recorded in the CMCG’s position.
11059/26 64
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Article 26
Tasks of the Critical Medicines Coordination Group
1. The CMCG shall facilitate coordination in the implementation of this Regulation, including,
where appropriate, by providing advice to the Commission or Member States at their
request, so as to maximise the impact of the measures envisaged and to avoid any unintended
effects on the internal market or on national healthcare systems.
2. In order to attain the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the CMCG shall perform the
following tasks:
(a) facilitate coordination on strategic orientation of the financial support for strategic
projects, including by exchanging information, where available, on the
manufacturing capacity for a given critical medicinal product, existing or planned, in
the Member States, and facilitate discussion on the capacity needed in the Union to
strengthen its supply security and availability of critical medicinal products, their
active substances and key inputs within the Union;
(aa) enable the exchanges of information between the Member States and the
Commission as referred to in Article 17 and, where necessary, facilitate
coordination of respective actions aiming to attain the objectives of this
Regulation;
(b) facilitate exchanges on the national programmes referred to in Article 19, promote
best practices and enable cooperation on, and coordination of, Member States public
procurement policies with regard to critical medicinal products;
(ba) facilitate exchanges of information on contingency stock requirements as referred
to in Article 20a(1);
(c) facilitate discussion on collaborative procurement initiatives;
11059/26 65
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
(d) provide recommendations to the MSSG on the order of priority of critical medicinal
products for vulnerability evaluation as set out in Regulation (EU) …/… +, and
propose a review or an update of existing evaluations where necessary;
(da) regularly discuss the potential contribution of strategic partnerships to the objectives
of this Regulation ▌ and the consistency and potential synergies between Member
States’ cooperation with relevant third countries and the actions carried out by the
Union;
(db) facilitate exchanges among Member States in order to explore interest in joint
reservation contracts;
(dc) enable strategic foresight discussions among Member States and stakeholders
taking into account long-term trends, vulnerabilities, opportunities for enhancing
the resilience and sustainability of supply chains of critical medicines within the
Union.
5. The CMCG, at the Commission’s or Member State's request, may provide an opinion on
matters related to the application of this Regulation in the context of performing tasks as
referred to in this Article.
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)) and in the corresponding footnote the number, date of adoption and
publication reference of that Regulation, including its ELI number.
11059/26 66
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Chapter VI
International cooperation
Article 27
Strategic partnerships
Without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council, the Commission, shall explore possibilities of
concluding strategic partnerships aiming to support the diversification of sources of supply of
critical medicinal products, their active substances and key inputs to increase the security of supply
of critical medicinal products in the Union. Such potential strategic partnerships may take the
form of dialogues on industrial, regulatory and policy matters, arrangements for stakeholders’
meetings or for experts’ exchanges.
The Commission shall also explore the possibility of building on existing forms of cooperation,
such as free trade agreements or association agreements, and in particular with candidate
countries where possible and appropriate, in order to support security of supply and reinforce
efforts to strengthen the production of critical medicinal products in the Union or diversification of
the supply sources. The Commission shall regularly inform the CMCG about their ongoing
considerations and assessments.
11059/26 67
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Chapter VII
Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2024/795
Article 28
Regulation (EU) 2024/795 is amended as follows:
(a) in Article 2(1), point (a) ▌ (iii), is replaced by the following:
‘(iii) biotechnologies, and any other technologies relevant for manufacturing of critical
medicinal products as defined in Article 2, point (...), of Regulation (EU) .../…+*;
_________
* Regulation (EU) …/… of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down
Union procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal products for
human use and establishing rules governing the European Medicines Agency, ▌
amending Regulations (EC) No 1394/2007 and Regulation (EU) No 536/2014 and
repealing Regulations (EC) No 141/2000 , (EC) No 726/2004, Regulation (EC)
No 141/2000 and Regulation (EC) No 1901/2006.’
(b) in Article 2, the following subparagraph is added in paragraph 3:
‘By way of derogation from the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the value chain for
the development or manufacturing of medicinal products that fall within the scope of the
[Critical Medicines Act] and that are referred to in paragraph 1, point (a)(iii), of this
Article, ▌ relates to finished dosage forms, as well as to active pharmaceutical ingredients
and other key inputs necessary for the production of the finished dosage forms of critical
medicinal products as defined in that Regulation.;’
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
11059/26 68
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(c) in Article 2, paragraph 8 is added:
‘8. Strategic projects designated in accordance with the [Critical Medicines Act] that
address a vulnerability in the supply chains of critical medicinal products shall be
deemed to contribute to the STEP objective referred to in paragraph 1, point (a)(iii).;’
(d) in Article 4, paragraph 7 is replaced by the following:
‘7. Strategic projects recognised in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Net-
Zero Industry Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act [and the Critical Medicines Act]
that fall within the scope of Article 2 of this Regulation and that receive a
contribution under the programmes referred to in Article 3 of this Regulation may
also receive a contribution from any other Union programme, including funds under
shared management, provided that those contributions do not cover the same costs.
The rules of the relevant Union programme shall apply to the corresponding
contribution to the strategic project. The cumulative funding shall not exceed the
total eligible costs of the strategic project. The support from the different Union
programmes may be calculated on a pro rata basis in accordance with the documents
setting out the conditions for support.;’
(e) in Article 6, paragraph 1, point c is replaced by the following:
‘(c) details of projects that have been recognised as strategic projects under the Net-Zero
Industry Act, the Critical Raw Materials Act and the [Critical Medicines Act], to the
extent that they fall within the scope of Article 2 of this Regulation.’
11059/26 69
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Chapter VIII
Final provisions
Article 29
Obligation of the market actors to provide information
1. For the purposes of Articles 6 and 8, Article 11(1), Articles 12 and 15, Article 16(2) and
Article 26(2), point (a), the national competent authorities concerned may request
information from promoters of industrial projects, project promoters, marketing
authorisation holders and other actors in the supply and distribution chains of critical
medicinal products, their ▌ active substances or key inputs, including from importers and
manufacturers of medicinal products, active substances or key inputs and relevant
suppliers of these, wholesale distributors, stakeholder representative associations or other
natural or legal persons or legal entities that are authorised or otherwise entitled to supply
medicinal products to the public.
For the purposes of Article 30, the national competent authorities and the Commission may
request information from the market actors referred to in paragraph 1, contracting
authorities and other stakeholders.
For the purposes of Article 11(2), the Agency may request information from project
promoters, marketing authorisation holders, manufacturers of medicinal products and
manufacturers or suppliers of active substances or key inputs.
2. Where information is requested by national competent authorities or the Agency, as
relevant, pursuant to paragraph 1, an actor may indicate that the information requested has
already been provided to the national competent authority concerned or the Agency
pursuant to other relevant Union legal acts. In such cases, the national competent authority
concerned or the Agency shall take due account of the information already provided in so
far as this information has been provided and may be used also for the purposes of this
Regulation.
11059/26 70
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
3. Where a market actor submits information pursuant to paragraph 1, that actor shall
indicate whether the information provided contains any commercially confidential
information, identify the relevant parts of that information having a commercially
confidential nature and explain why that information is of such nature. The Commission,
the national competent authority or the Agency, as relevant, shall assess the merits of each
confidentiality claim made by the actors and shall protect any information that is
commercially confidential against unjustified disclosure in accordance with Article 29a.
Article 29a
Handling of confidential information
1. Information acquired in the course of implementing this Regulation shall be protected by
the relevant Union and national law.
2. Member States, the Commission and the Agency shall ensure the protection of trade and
business secrets and other commercially confidential information obtained and processed
in application of this Regulation, in accordance with relevant Union and national law.
3. The Commission, the Agency and the national competent authorities, their officials,
employees and other persons working under the supervision of those authorities shall
ensure, in accordance with relevant Union or national law, the confidentiality of
information obtained while carrying out their tasks and activities pursuant to this
Regulation. This obligation also applies to all representatives of Member States, observers,
experts and other participants attending meetings of the CMCG pursuant to Article 25.
4. A Member State may refuse to share information where it concerns the essential interests
of its security and defence.
11059/26 71
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Article 30
Evaluation
1. By … [five years from the date of application of this Regulation] and every five years
thereafter, the Commission shall evaluate this Regulation, including its impact on the
security of supply of medicinal products and the use of collaborative procurement and
submit a report on the main findings to the European Parliament, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of the Regions.
2. The Commission shall in its evaluation assess the impact of this Regulation and to what extent
its objectives as established in Article 1 have been achieved. The evaluation shall include an
assessment of the scope, functioning and efficiency of Article 18, as well as of the
coherence of this Regulation with the developments in the field of public procurement.
3. The national authorities and other actors shall, upon request, provide the Commission with
any relevant information they have and that the Commission may need for its assessment
pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2.
3a. The report referred to in paragraph 1 shall, where appropriate, be accompanied by
legislative proposals.
Article 30a
Committee Procedure
1. The Commission shall be assisted by a committee. That committee shall be a committee
within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011.
2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 182/2011 shall
apply.
11059/26 72
ANNEX LIFE.5 EN
Article 31
Entry into force and application
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the
Official Journal of the European Union.
It shall apply from the date of the first publication in the Official Journal of the Union list of
critical medicinal products established in accordance with Article 137 of Regulation (EU) …/…+.
The requirements in Article 18(1) and (2) shall apply to public procurement procedures launched
after that date.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at Strasbourg,
For the European Parliament For the Council
The President The President
+ OJ: please insert in the text the number of the Regulation in document ST 7105/26
(2023/0131(COD)).
2026-06-30T15:33:26+0000
Guarantee of Integrity and Authenticity
02.07.2026
Datei
PD
Wie sich das GKV-Beitragssatz-
Stabilisierungs-Gesetz (BStabG) auf die
Innovationsfähigkeit der Pharmabranche
und die Arzneimittelversorgung auswirkt
Die zentralen Aspekte auf einen Blick
• Die im BStabG geplanten Sparmaßnahmen zielen hauptsächlich auf den
Patentmarkt, aber auch der Generikamarkt ist betroffen.1
• Rund 85 Prozent dieses patentgeschützten Arzneimittelmarktes entfallen auf
Arzneimittel gegen lebensbedrohliche oder schwere chronische
Erkrankungen: Krebs, schwere Autoimmun- und Entzündungserkrankungen,
Schlaganfall-Prävention und Thrombose sowie Diabetes mit
Folgeerkrankungen.2
• Die GKV-Arzneimittelausgaben lagen 2025 bei 58,49 Mrd. Euro (+5,9 % im
Vergleich zum Vorjahreszeitraum). Mit einem Anstieg der Leistungsausgaben
um 5,9% ist das Wachstum im Vergleich zu anderen Leistungsbereichen
unterdurchschnittlich. Zur Einordnung: die Leistungsausgaben stiegen um 7,9
%, Ausgaben für Krankenhausbehandlungen um 9,6 %, Ausgaben für
ambulant ärztliche Behandlungen um 7,6%.
1BMG, Finanzentwicklung GKV 2025; AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025.
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/meldungen/finanzentwicklung-gkv-2025
2Eigene Berechnung auf Basis IQVIA-Marktbericht Q4/2025 (GKV-Gesamtmarkt 59,3 Mrd. €) und AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025
(patentgeschützter Markt = 54 % der Kosten). https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-
marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.bundesgesundheitsministerium.de/ministerium/meldungen/finanzentwicklung-gkv-2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
• 3Der geplante (dynamische) Herstellerabschlag kann den Zwangsrabatt auf
innovative Arzneimittel bis 2030 auf über 20 Prozent treiben – eine
Verfünffachung der jährlichen Belastung von 1,1 auf 5,5 Mrd. Euro.4
• Die Maßnahmen wirken kumulierend. Dynamischer Herstellerabschlag,
neue Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, Preis-Mengen-
Regelungen und das verlängerte Preismoratorium treffen dieselben
Arzneimittel gleichzeitig und übereinander gelagert. Damit gefährdet nicht nur
jede Maßnahme für sich, sondern insbesondere ihr Zusammenwirken Zugang,
Therapievielfalt und Standort.5
• Die Preissenkungen wirken additiv auf bereits verhandelte Preise. Also
Preise, die im Rahmen des AMNOG-Verfahrens bereits auf der Basis von
Nutzenbewertungen gefunden wurden. Aus dieser Basis wurde mit der
Krankenkasse ein Preis verhandelt, der dem Wert des Arzneimittels für
Patienten entspricht.
• Die Pharmaindustrie ist mit einer Investitionsquote von 5,7 Prozent die
investitionsstärkste Industrie Deutschlands. Kurzfristige, kumulierende
Preiseingriffe gefährden langfristig geplante Standortinvestitionen.6
4Pharma Deutschland: Risiken des GKV-BStabG für Arzneimittelversorgung und Innovation.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-
innovation/
5Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
6IW Köln, PharmaKompakt 2025.
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Gutachten/Pharma_Standort_D/2025/PharmaKompakt_2025_DE.pdf
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Studien/Gutachten/Pharma_Standort_D/2025/PharmaKompakt_2025_DE.pdf
Verteilung des GKV-Umsatzes nach
Erkrankungsschwere (2025)
Das GKV-BStabG belastet ausgerechnet den Marktteil am stärksten, der die
Versorgung Schwerstkranker sichert und die forschungs- und investitionsstärkste
Industrie Deutschlands trägt.7
Erkrankungskategorie Beispiel-Wirkstoffklassen (Cluster) GKV-Umsatz
2025* Anteil**
Krebserkrankungen &
Immuntherapien
MAB-Antineoplastika,
Proteinkinasehemmer,
Hormonantagonisten
~ 9,5 – 10,1
Mrd. € ~ 39 %
Schwere Autoimmun-
/Entzündungserkrankungen
Anti-TNF, Interleukin-Inhibitoren,
JAK-Inhibitoren, MS-Mittel
~ 6,8 – 7,0
Mrd. € ~ 28 %
Diabetes mit schweren
Komplikationen
SGLT2-Hemmer, GLP-1-Agonisten,
Insulin-Analoga
~ 5,0 – 5,2
Mrd. € ~ 21 %
Schlaganfall-Prävention &
Thrombose
Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer
(Apixaban, Rivaroxaban, Edoxaban)
~ 2,9 – 3,0
Mrd. € ~ 12 %
Summe vier Cluster
Summe
schwere/lebensbedrohliche
Erkrankungen (vier Cluster)
~ 24,2 – 25,3
Mrd. €
~ 41 – 43
% des
GKV-
Marktes
\.GKV‗Umsatz.868❶.(IQVIA.Apothekenmarkt?.Jan Dez.868❶)¡.\\.Anteil.der.ersten.drei.Spalten.am.umsatzstarken.
Marktsegment.der.vier.Cluster.(∫ .80?8 8❶?9.Mrd¡.₭)·.die.letzte.Zeile.bezieht.den.Anteil.auf.den.GKV‗Gesamtmarkt.(❶❺?9.Mrd¡.
₭)¡.Werte.gerundet·.Schätzung.auf.Basis.der.ATC‗Gruppen.und.Hauptindikationen¡
7Eigene Berechnung auf Basis der ATC-Umsätze 2025 (IQVIA Q4/2025) der vier Versorgungscluster. Der Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025
bestätigt qualitativ, dass es sich „ganz überwiegend um Arzneimittel gegen sehr schwere bis mittelschwere Erkrankungen“ handelt.
https://www.mwv-
berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d209028
29b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
https://www.mwv-berlin.de/media/6e519139dabd9dfbca62c3f478d646dc35455018/5d37c448e19e26162cefe943c7dffc6d3804501f/e73dff2d20902829b3955df25e0387fe2f3c1c2b.pdf
Die vier Therapie-Cluster (Datenbasis 2025)
Die umsatzstärksten patentgeschützten Präparate ordnen sich vier Versorgungs-
Clustern zu. Für jedes Cluster sind Leit-Wirkstoffklassen, GKV-Umsatz 2025 und
Marktentwicklung dargestellt.
Übersicht: Cluster-Umsätze im GKV-Markt 2025
Therapie-Cluster GKV-Umsatz
2025 (Schätzung)
Anteil
Gesamtmarkt
Wachstum
vs. 2024
Leit-
Wirkstoffklassen
Onkologie &
Immuntherapien 9,5 – 10,1 Mrd. € 16 – 17 % +10 – 12 %
MAB-Antineoplastika,
Proteinkinasehemmer,
Hormonantagonisten
Autoimmun- &
entzündliche
Erkrankungen
6,8 – 7,0 Mrd. € 11,5 – 11,8 % -5 bis -8 %
Anti-TNF, Interleukin-
Inhibitoren, JAK-
Inhibitoren, MS-Mittel
Diabetes &
Stoffwechsel 5,0 – 5,2 Mrd. € 8,5 – 8,8 % +20 – 25 %
SGLT2-Hemmer,
GLP-1-Agonisten,
Insulin-Analoga
Herz-Kreislauf &
Thrombose (B01) 2,9 – 3,0 Mrd. € ~ 5,0 % +0,8 %
(B01F)
Direkte Faktor-Xa-
Hemmer, ARNI,
PCSK9-Inhibitoren
Quelle¿.IQVIA.Pharma‗Marktbericht.Q0―868❶.(Gesamtjahr.868❶?.ATC‗Gruppen)·.ergänzt.um.GAmSi.Bayern.Q7―868❶.und.
Arzneimittel‗Atlas.868❶¡.Schätzungen·.Überschneidungen.(SGLT8‗Hemmer.Diabetes―Herz‗Kreislauf).im.Text.gekennzeichnet¡.
Vier.Cluster.gesamt.∫ .80?8 8❶?9.Mrd¡.₭.(∫ .07 09.↘ .des.GKV‗Marktes)¡8
8IQVIA Pharma-Marktbericht Q4/2025; GAmSi Bayern KV71 Q1/2025; IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025. https://www.iqvia.com/-
/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Onkologie & Immuntherapien
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 9,5 – 10,1 Mrd. € (L01G 4.327 Mio. € +5,8 %; L01H 3.298 Mio. €
+14,0 %; L02B 1.502 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen
Diverse Krebserkrankungen: nicht-kleinzelliges Lungenkarzinom,
Melanom, multiples Myelom, chronische lymphatische Leukämie,
Mammakarzinom, Prostatakarzinom u. v. m.
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
PD-1/PD-L1-Inhibitoren (Checkpoint-Inhibition), Proteinkinasehemmer
(CDK-, BTK-Inhibitoren), CD38-Antikörper, EGFR-Inhibitoren,
zytostatische Hormonantagonisten
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Plattformtechnologien (Antikörper, Checkpoint-Inhibition),
biopharmazeutische Produktion, Kombinations- und
Sequenztherapien; höchste Wachstumsrate aller Cluster
(Proteinkinasehemmer L01H +14,0 % p. a.).
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Ein onkologisches bereits preisverhandeltes Präparat kann gleichzeitig vom
(dynamischen) Herstellerabschlag, vom Rabattvertrag für patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel (PD-1/PD-L1- bzw. PARP-Inhibitoren als Pilotgruppen) und
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarungen getroffen werden.
• Rabattverträge auf PD-1/PD-L1- und PARP-Inhibitoren zwingen
therapeutisch nicht beliebig austauschbare Wirkstoffe in einen
Preiswettbewerb.
• Die zusätzlichen Abschläge machen Markteinführungen neuer Indikationen
unkalkulierbar.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025; GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025; Der Arzneimittelbrief 2026
https://der-arzneimittelbrief.com/artikel/2026/keytruda-teuerstes-krebsmedikament-moegliche-einsparpotenziale-und-wie-krankenkassen-unnoetig-finanziell-belastet-werden
Cluster Autoimmun- & entzündliche Erkrankungen
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 6,8 – 7,0 Mrd. € (L04C 2.404 Mio. € -24,1 %; L04B 2.242 Mio. € -4,1
%; N07A MS 1.681 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen
Rheumatoide Arthritis, Psoriasis/Psoriasisarthritis, Morbus Crohn,
Colitis ulcerosa, atopische Dermatitis, Multiple Sklerose, Spondylitis
ankylosans
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
Anti-TNF-Inhibitoren (Adalimumab), Interleukin-Inhibitoren
(Ustekinumab, Risankizumab, Secukinumab, Dupilumab), JAK-
Inhibitoren (Upadacitinib), MS-Mittel
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Biologika und niedermolekulare Immunmodulatoren (JAK),
Indikationserweiterungen über mehrere chronische Erkrankungen;
bereits intensiver Biosimilar-Wettbewerb (L04C -24,1 % Umsatz bei
nur -4,9 % Absatz, getrieben durch das Ustekinumab-Biosimilar).
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Das Cluster steht bereits unter starkem Biosimilar-Preiswettbewerb
(Umsatz L04C -24,1 % zzgl. hoher vertraulicher Rabatte). Der (dynamische)
Herstellerabschlag legt sich zusätzlich auf die verbleibenden
patentgeschützten Wirkstoffe – mit dem Risiko, dass einzelne Indikationen
unwirtschaftlich werden.
• JAK-Inhibitoren stehen auf der Pilotliste für Rabattverträge auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel. Sie werden damit doppelt erfasst: durch den
dynamischen Abschlag und durch einen Substitutionszwang nach
Rabattvertrag – trotz unterschiedlicher Sicherheitsprofile und Zulassungen.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (L04C 2.404 Mio. €, L04B 2.242 Mio. €); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Diabetes & Stoffwechsel
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 5,0 – 5,2 Mrd. € (A10P SGLT2 2.013 Mio. € +15,1 %; A10S GLP-1
1.261 Mio. € +56,0 %; A10C Insulin 1.186 Mio. €)
Versorgte Indikationen Typ-2-Diabetes, Herzinsuffizienz (HFrEF/HFpEF), chronische
Niereninsuffizienz; kardiometabolische Folgeerkrankungen
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
SGLT2-Hemmer (Empagliflozin, Dapagliflozin), GLP-1-Agonisten
(Semaglutid, Tirzepatid), Insulin-Analoga
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Indikationsausweitung kardiometabolischer Wirkstoffe (Herz, Niere);
stärkstes Mengen- und Umsatzwachstum im gesamten GKV-Markt
(GLP-1-Agonisten +56 % Umsatz, +24,2 % Absatz), hohe Public-
Health-Relevanz.
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• Der (dynamische) Herstellerabschlag koppelt die Rabatthöhe an das
Ausgabenwachstum des Patentmarktes. Gerade die wachstumsstärksten
Cluster – SGLT2-Hemmer (+15,1 %) und GLP-1-Agonisten (+56 %) –
treiben damit ihren eigenen Zwangsrabatt nach oben und kumulieren so
die Belastung über die Jahre.
• Die Preis-Mengen-Regelung als gesetzliche Auffanglösung (ohne
Schiedsstellenbefassung) legt sich zusätzlich auf volumenstarke
Stoffwechseltherapien und erhöht die Belastung ein weiteres Mal.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (A10P, A10S, A10C); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Cluster Herz-Kreislauf & Thrombose
GKV-Umsatz 2025 ≈ 2,9 – 3,0 Mrd. € (B01F Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer 2.705 Mio. € +0,8
%); mit Lipidsenkern/PCSK9 ≈ 4,4 – 5,0 Mrd. €
Versorgte Indikationen
Schlaganfall-Prävention bei Vorhofflimmern, Therapie und Prophylaxe
von Venenthrombose und Lungenembolie, Herzinsuffizienz,
Sekundärprävention kardiovaskulärer Ereignisse
Leitpräparate
(Wirkstoffklassen)
Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer (Apixaban, Rivaroxaban, Edoxaban), ARNI
(Sacubitril/Valsartan), PCSK9-Inhibitoren
Investitionsschwerpunkt
Großvolumige Versorgung mit hohem Public-Health-Nutzen
(Schlaganfall-Vermeidung); Lebenszyklus-Management und
Folgeindikationen.
Gefährdung durch das GKV-BStabG
• PCSK9-Inhibitoren sind eine der fünf Pilot-Wirkstoffgruppen für
Rabattverträge – ein Eingriff in die Sekundärprävention. Gleichzeitig greift
auf patentgeschützte Wirkstoffe des Clusters der (dynamische)
Herstellerabschlag; beide Maßnahmen wirken übereinander.
• Faktor-Xa-Hemmer (orale Antikoagulanzien, B01F: 2.705 Mio. € 2025)
zählen zu den umsatzstärksten Präparaten überhaupt und sind
lebensnotwendig für die Schlaganfall-Prävention. Diese pauschalen,
kumulierenden Abschläge gefährden die wirtschaftliche Versorgung
großer Patientengruppen.
Quelle¿.IQVIA Q4/2025 (B01F 2.704,5 Mio. €); GAmSi Bayern Q1/2025
https://www.iqvia.com/-/media/iqvia/pdfs/germany/library/publications/iqvia-pharma-marktbericht-classic-q4-2025.pdf
Die pharmarelevanten Maßnahmen des GKV-BStabG
(Dynamischer) Herstellerabschlag (§ 130a Abs. 1b SGB V-E)
Was
Der bestehende Herstellerabschlag von 7 % auf patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel wird um eine dynamische Komponente ergänzt, die an die
Ausgabenentwicklung im Patentmarkt gekoppelt ist. Alternativ ist auch ein
fixer Gesamtrabatt von 15,5% in der Diskussion
Zeitplan
Jan.–Jun. 2027: statisch +3,5 Prozentpunkte (= 10,5 %). Ab Juli 2027:
jährlich dynamisch berechneter Zusatzabschlag, Höhe abhängig von
Ausgaben- und Einnahmenentwicklung.
Finanzieller
Umfang
1,1 Mrd. € (2027) bis 5,5 Mrd. € (2030) – eine Verfünffachung; Simulationen
zeigen einen Gesamtabschlag von über 20 % bis 2030.
Ausnahmen
Festbetragsarzneimittel, Generika, Biosimilars, Impfstoffe, patentfreie
versorgungskritische Arzneimittel nach §52b Abs. 3c AMG, patentfreie
Kinderarzneimittel nach §35 Abs. 5a SGB V, vom Preismoratorium befreite
Arzneimittel, Reserveantibiotika, Wirkstoffe mit klinischen Studien und
Produktion in Deutschland.
Auswirkungen
• Ein (dynamischer, jährlich neu festgesetzter) Zwangsrabatt entzieht
Investitions- und Standortentscheidungen die Kalkulations- und
Planungsgrundlage.
• Jeder zusätzliche Euro Rabatterhöhung schadet der Volkswirtschaft um bis
zu 3,80 Euro.9
Quellen¿.Pharma.Deutschland.―.vfa‗Factsheet·.BMG‗Referentenentwurf¡10
9VCI, Pressemitteilung zum GKV-Sparpaket, April 2026. https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-
bundesregierung.jsp
10Pharma Deutschland: Risiken des GKV-BStabG für Arzneimittelversorgung und Innovation.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-
innovation/
https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-bundesregierung.jsp
https://www.vci.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/gkv-sparpaket-der-bundesregierung.jsp
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/themen/gkv-beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz-risiken-fuer-arzneimittelversorgung-und-innovation/
Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
(§ 130e SGB V-E, neu)
Was
Krankenkassen dürfen erstmals Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel mit therapeutisch vergleichbarer Wirkung abschließen
(Clusterausschreibungen). Vertragsärzte müssen rabattierte Arzneimittel
verordnen. Ausnahmen sind unter hohem bürokratischem Aufwand zu
begründen..
Pilotphase
Vorerst befristet bis 31.12.2030, zunächst fünf Wirkstoffgruppen: JAK-
Inhibitoren, CGRP-Antagonisten, PARP-Inhibitoren, PCSK9-Inhibitoren, PD-
1/PD-L1-Inhibitoren.
Bericht über die Auswirkungen durch den GKV SV an das BMG.
Cluster-
Betroffenheit
Direkter Eingriff in Onkologie (PD-1/PD-L1, PARP), Herz-Kreislauf (PCSK9),
Autoimmun (JAK) und Neurologie (CGRP).
Auswirkungen
• Innovative, oft nicht gleichwertige Wirkstoffe werden nach ihrer
Nutzenbewertung im AMNOG in einen reinen Preiswettbewerb gezwungen.
Das Ergebnis des AMNOG Verfahrens wird damit gänzlich entwertet. Das
RisikoDas Risiko für die Versorgung sind Marktrücknahmen und eine
eingeschränkte Therapiewahl für Patientinnen und Patienten. Die
Maßnahmen führen zu einer Verschlechterung der Versorgung für bestimmte
Therapiegebiete
• Rabattverträge waren bislang Generika vorbehalten. Ihre Ausweitung auf
den Patentmarkt unterläuft die bereits verhandelten AMNOG-
Erstattungsbeträge und addiert sich auf den dynamischen
Herstellerabschlag derselben Wirkstoffe.
Quellen¿.Pharma.Deutschland¿.Inhalte.des.GKV‗BStabG¡11
11Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
Preis-Mengen-Regelung
Was Die im Rahmen der 130b SGB V zu verhandelnde Preis-Mengen Regelung
wird gesetzlich festgeschrieben.
Finanzieller
Umfang
Je 100 Mio.€ Umsatz plus 1% Preisabschlag. Das ist eine Verzehnfachung
der bisherigen Preis-Mengen-Regel die im Rahmen des GKV-FinStabG in
2023 geschaffen wurde
Cluster-
Betroffenheit
Alle Arzneimittel mit Erstattungsbetrag nach §130b SGB V, Rückwirkung
durch Sonderkündigungsrecht
Auswirkungen
• Eine starrer Preis-Mengen-Algorithmus nimmt der Kassen und der Industrie
Verhandlungsfreiheit. Es kann nicht mehr der Einzelfall berücksichtigt
werden
• Mengen steigen durch mehr Nachfrage nach einem Arzneimittel. Gründe
dafür sind Demographie (mehr Arzneimittelverbrauch) oder der hohe Nutzen
für den Patient. Diese Regelung bestrafft also gerade Arzneimittel, die für
den Patienten einen hohen Wert bieten
Kumulative Wirkung der Maßnahmen
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel und die Preis-
Mengen greifen gleichzeitig und übereinander in die Innovationscluster Onkologie,
Autoimmun, Diabetes und Herz-Kreislauf ein. Diese kumulierenden Effekte werden
sich unmittelbar auf die Therapievielfalt, die Markteinführungen und die langfristige
Produktionsinvestitionen am Standort Deutschland auswirken und sich bei der
Arzneimittelversorgung, der Wirtschaftskraft der Pharmazeutischen Industrie und
damit der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung Deutschlands negativ bemerkbar machen.
Die kombinierte Netto-Belastung der Pharmaindustrie aus dynamischem
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträgen und Preis-Mengen-Regelung beziffert das BMG
für 2030 auf 5,75 Mrd. Euro – knapp 19 % der Gesamteinsparungen über alle
Sektoren, obwohl der Arzneimittelmarkt nur 12% der Leistungsausgaben ausmacht.
Instrument Aktuell Geplant 2027
Allg. Herstellerabschlag 7 % 10,5 % (dynamisch)
Alternativ fixer
Herstellerabschlag 7% 15,5%
Rabattverträge Patent-AM nicht möglich
Pilot für 5 Wirkstoffgruppen,
Annahme 30% Rabatt
(Techniker Krankenkasse in
Pharma Dialog Äußerungen
von 50%)
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarung 0,1% pro 100
Mio € 1% pro 100 Mio €
Mehrfachbelastung je Cluster
Die folgende Matrix macht sichtbar, dass die meisten Cluster nicht von einer, sondern
von mehreren Maßnahmen gleichzeitig getroffen werden. Genau diese Überlagerung –
nicht die einzelne Maßnahme – ist die eigentliche Gefahr für Innovation und Versorgung.
Cluster AMNOG
Prozess
(Dyn.)
Herstellerabschlag
Rabattvertrag
(Pilot)
Preis-
Mengen-
Regelung
Belastungsstufen
Onkologie &
Immuntherapien ja ja ja (PD-1/PD-
L1, PARP) ja 4-fach
Autoimmun &
Entzündung ja ja ja (JAK) ja 4-fach
Herz-Kreislauf &
Thrombose ja ja ja (PCSK9) ja 4-fach
Diabetes &
Stoffwechsel ja ja
(selbstverstärkend) – ja 3-fach
Lesehilfe¿.«Belastungsstufen».zählt?.wie.viele.der.kritisierten.Instrumente.einen.Cluster.direkt.erfassen¡.Das.Onkologie‗
Cluster.trägt.mit.vier.sich.überlagernden.Maßnahmen.die.höchste.kumulative.Belastung·.im.Diabetes‗Cluster.verstärkt.der.
dynamische.Abschlag.durch.die.Wachstumskopplung.sich.selbst¡12
12Eigene Darstellung auf Basis Pharma Deutschland: Inhalte des GKV-BStabG; § 130a/§ 130e SGB V-E.
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
https://www.pharmadeutschland.de/newsroom/news/inhalte-des-gkv-beitragsstabilisierungsgesetz/
Zwei exemplarische Beispiele wie sich die
Kumulation finanziell auswirken wird am Beispiel des
statischen Herstellerabschlages
Ein Onkologikum oder ein anderes patentgeschütztes Präparat kann 2027 ff. zusätzlich
zum bereits verhandelten AMNOG-Erstattungsbetrag und zum Preismoratorium zur
selben Zeit dem (dynamischen) Herstellerabschlag, einem Rabattvertrag (PD-1/PD-L1
oder PARP) und Preis-Mengenvereinbarungen unterliegen.
Jede Maßnahme aus dem GKV-Beitragssatz-Stabilisierungs-Gesetz mag für sich
begrenzt erscheinen. In der Überlagerung der Maßnahmen entsteht eine Belastung, die
einzelne Indikationen oder Wirkstoffe unwirtschaftlich machen und zu
Marktrücknahmen führen kann.
Instrument Präparat xy 100 Mio €
Umsatz
Präparat xy 500 Mio €
Umsatz
AMNOG Verfahren z.B.
Beträchtlicher Zusatznutzen -30%
verhandelter Erstattungsbetrag,
(Mittelwert AMNOG
Verhandlungen,
Herstellerabschlag abgelöst)
-30% bereits erfolgt -30% bereits erfolgt
Neu:
Allg. Herstellerabschlag -15,5% 15,5%
Rabattverträge Patent-AM
(geschätzt anhand von
Kassenerwartungen)
-30% -30%
Preis-Mengen-Vereinbarung 100 Mio € x 1% = -1% 500 Mio € x 1% = -5%
Ergebnis in Prozent (Summe
Maßnahmen BStabG) -46,5% - 50,5%
Ergebnis in € (Summe
Maßnahmen BStabG) 53,5 Mio € nach Rabatten 247,5 Mio € nach Rabatten
Diese Beispiele zeigen sehr eindrücklich was für extreme Auswirkungen die Kumulation
der Rabatte auf die Umsätze der Industrie hat. Dieses wird noch verschärft durch
internationale Preisreferenzierung, die die Auswirkungen auf den internationalen
Märkten für die Industrie ca. mit dem Faktor 4 erhöht.
Jedes Unternehmen muss sich die betriebswirtschaftliche Frage stellen, ob es
ökonomisch sinnvoll ist die Arzneimittel in Deutschland weiter zu vertreiben. Das ist
keine Drohung, sondern betriebswirtschaftliche Realität, wie in jeder anderen Branche
auch.
Einordnung und Methodik
• Pharma Deutschland hat die Wirkung des GKV-
Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetzes (GKV-BStabG) auf die forschende
Pharmaindustrie in Deutschland analysiert. Als Grundgesamtheit dienen die
umsatzstärksten patentgeschützten Präparate bzw. ihre Hersteller im
deutschen GKV-Markt. Die Darstellung der Auswirkungen erfolgt nach vier
Therapie-Clustern, um die gesellschaftliche Bedeutung der betroffenen
Versorgung in den Vordergrund zu stellen.
• Der GKV-Arzneimittelmarkt erreichte 2025 ein Volumen von rund 58,49 Mrd.
Euro (+5,9 % gegenüber 2024);13. Auf patentgeschützte Arzneimittel entfielen
davon rund 54 Prozent der Kosten. Genau dieser hochinnovative Patentmarkt
steht im Zentrum der geplanten Sparmaßnahmen.
• Alle quantitativen Aussagen sind über Fußnoten mit den jeweiligen Primär- bzw.
Verbandsquellen belegt. Die Marktwerte 2025 stammen aus dem IQVIA
Pharma-Marktbericht Q4/2025 (Gesamtjahr 2025, Bundesdaten) und dem BMG
(KV45). Cluster-Umsätze sind Schätzungen auf Basis der ATC-Gruppen des
IQVIA-Berichts 2025 und der GAmSi-Quartalsdaten (Bayern KV71 Q1/2025)
sowie der Hauptindikationen; Überschneidungen zwischen Clustern (z. B.
SGLT2-Hemmer in Diabetes und Herzinsuffizienz) sind möglich und im Text
gekennzeichnet.
Quellen und Hinweise:
• Die Datenbasis bilden der GKV-GAmSi-Quartalsbericht 2025, die IQVIA
Pharma-Marktberichte Q2–Q4/2025 mit Bundesdaten für das Gesamtjahr 2025,
der IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025, der AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass 2025, das
arznei-telegramm 8/2025 sowie ergänzende Verbands- und
Ministeriumsquellen.
• Zentrale Primärquellen sind insbesondere IQVIA Pharma-Marktbericht Q2–
Q4/2025, BMG Finanzentwicklung GKV 2025 (KV45), GKV-GAmSi Bayern
KV71 Q1/2025, IGES Arzneimittel-Atlas 2025, AOK Arzneimittel-Kompass
2025, arznei-telegramm 8/2025, IW Köln PharmaKompakt 2025, vfa AMNOG-
Daten und der BMG-Referentenentwurf zum GKV-BStabG.
• Die Cluster-Umsätze sind Schätzungen auf Basis der ATC-Gruppen und der
Hauptindikationen; Überschneidungen zwischen Clustern, etwa bei SGLT2-
Hemmern in Diabetes und Herzinsuffizienz, sind möglich und im Text
gekennzeichnet.
• Vollständige URLs finden sich in den Fußnoten.
Abkürzungs- und Begriffsverzeichnis
Gesetze und Paragrafen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AMNOG Arzneimittelmarkt-
Neuordnungsgesetz
Seit 2011 geltendes Gesetz. Regelt, dass für
jedes neue Arzneimittel der Zusatznutzen
bewertet und daraufhin ein Erstattungspreis
mit den Kassen verhandelt wird.
GKV-BStabG GKV-
Beitragssatzstabilisierungsgesetz
Das im Fact-Sheet analysierte „Spargesetz
2025/26“. Soll die Beitragssätze der
gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
stabilisieren – u. a. durch neue Abschläge auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel.
SGB V Fünftes Buch Sozialgesetzbuch Das zentrale Gesetzbuch zur gesetzlichen
Krankenversicherung in Deutschland.
SGB V-E Sozialgesetzbuch V –
Entwurfsfassung
Der Zusatz „-E“ kennzeichnet eine geplante,
noch nicht in Kraft getretene Fassung
(Gesetzentwurf).
§ 130a SGB V Paragraf zum Herstellerabschlag
Rechtsgrundlage für den (auch dynamischen)
Zwangsrabatt, den Hersteller den Kassen
gewähren müssen.
§ 130b SGB V Paragraf zur
Erstattungsbetragsverhandlung
Regelt die AMNOG-Preisverhandlung; Abs. 3
enthielt die sogenannten „Leitplanken“.
§ 130e SGB V Paragraf zu Kombinations- und
Patent-Rabatten
Rechtsgrundlage für den
Kombinationsabschlag und – neu geplant – für
Rabattverträge auf patentgeschützte
Arzneimittel.
BVerfG Bundesverfassungsgericht Höchstes deutsches Gericht; prüfte 2025 die
Verhältnismäßigkeit des Preismoratoriums.
G-BA Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss
Oberstes Beschlussgremium der
Selbstverwaltung im Gesundheitswesen;
benennt u. a. die von Abschlägen betroffenen
Wirkstoff-Kombinationen.
Institutionen, Verbände und Datenquellen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AOK Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse Größte gesetzliche Krankenkassengruppe;
gibt den „Arzneimittel-Kompass“ heraus.
arznei-telegramm Unabhängiger Arzneimittel-
Informationsdienst
Herstellerunabhängige Fachpublikation zur
Bewertung von Arzneimitteln.
BMG Bundesministerium für Gesundheit Zuständiges Ministerium; veröffentlicht u. a.
die GKV-Finanzentwicklung (Statistik „KV45“).
BPI Bundesverband der
Pharmazeutischen Industrie
Branchenverband der Pharmaindustrie in
Deutschland.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
CDMO Contract Development and
Manufacturing Organization
Auftragsentwickler und -hersteller;
Dienstleister, die Arzneimittel für andere
Firmen produzieren.
GAmSi GKV-Arzneimittel-
Schnellinformation
Amtliche, zeitnahe Statistik über
Arzneimittelverordnungen zu Lasten der
gesetzlichen Krankenkassen.
GKV Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
Das solidarisch finanzierte
Pflichtversicherungssystem, in dem rund 90 %
der Bevölkerung versichert sind.
GKV-Spitzenverband Spitzenverband Bund der
Krankenkassen
Zentrale Interessenvertretung aller
gesetzlichen Kranken- und Pflegekassen;
verhandelt u. a. die Erstattungsbeträge.
IGES IGES Institut
Forschungs- und Beratungsinstitut im
Gesundheitswesen; erstellt den „Arzneimittel-
Atlas“.
IQVIA IQVIA
(Marktforschungsunternehmen)
Führender Anbieter von Markt- und
Verordnungsdaten im Gesundheitswesen;
Quelle des „Pharma-Marktberichts“.
IW Köln Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft
Köln
Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut; erstellt u. a. die
Studie „PharmaKompakt“.
KV45 / KV71 Amtliche GKV-Finanz- bzw.
Statistikvordrucke
Standardisierte Meldeformulare der Kassen;
„KV45“ = GKV-Finanzergebnisse, „KV71“ =
regionale Verordnungsstatistik (hier Bayern).
MWV Medizinisch Wissenschaftliche
Verlagsgesellschaft
Verlag, in dem u. a. der Arzneimittel-Atlas
erscheint.
VCI Verband der Chemischen Industrie Branchenverband der Chemie- und
Pharmaindustrie in Deutschland.
vfa Verband forschender
Arzneimittelhersteller
Interessenverband der forschenden
Pharmaunternehmen in Deutschland.
Sparmaßnahmen und Begriffe der Preisregulierung
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
AMNOG-Leitplanken Preisobergrenzen im AMNOG-
Verfahren
Gesetzliche Deckelung des verhandelbaren
Preises je nach Zusatznutzen. Werden durch
das GKV-BStabG abgeschafft (Erfolg aus
Branchensicht).
Dynamischer
Herstellerabschlag
An das Ausgabenwachstum
gekoppelter Zwangsrabatt
Pflichtrabatt der Hersteller auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, der mit
steigenden Patentmarkt-Ausgaben
automatisch mitwächst – Kern der Kritik im
Fact-Sheet.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
Erstattungsbetrag Verhandelter Preis in der GKV
Der zwischen Hersteller und Kassen
ausgehandelte Preis, den die GKV für ein
neues Arzneimittel erstattet.
Festbetrag Erstattungshöchstgrenze für
Arzneimittelgruppen
Fester Höchstbetrag, den die Kasse für
vergleichbare Wirkstoffe zahlt; darüber zahlt
der Patient die Differenz.
Herstellerabschlag Gesetzlicher Pflichtrabatt der
Hersteller
Fester (bislang 7 %) Zwangsrabatt auf den
Herstellerabgabepreis patentgeschützter
Arzneimittel.
Kombinationsabschlag Rabatt auf Kombinationstherapien
(§ 130e)
Seit Oktober 2024 20 % Abschlag auf
patentgeschützte Arzneimittel, die in vom G-
BA benannten Kombinationen eingesetzt
werden.
Nutzenbewertung Bewertung des Zusatznutzens
(AMNOG)
Prüfung, ob ein neues Arzneimittel gegenüber
der bisherigen Standardtherapie einen
belegten Zusatznutzen bietet.
Preismoratorium Einfrieren der Herstellerpreise
Seit 2010 sind die Herstellerpreise auf dem
Stand von August 2009 eingefroren;
Verlängerung bis 2030 geplant.
Preis-Mengen-
Regelung
Automatische Preissenkung bei
hohen Absatzmengen
Mechanismus, der bei stark steigenden
Verordnungsmengen den Preis senkt – als
gesetzliche Auffanglösung vorgesehen.
Rabattverträge Exklusive Preisvereinbarungen
einzelner Kassen
Bisher nur bei Generika üblich; sollen künftig
(Pilot) auch für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
gelten, mit Substitutionspflicht für Ärzte.
Substitution Austausch durch ein anderes
Präparat
Ersetzen des verordneten Arzneimittels durch
ein rabattiertes, therapeutisch vergleichbares
Präparat.
Tagesdosen (DDD) Definierte Tagesdosis (Defined
Daily Dose)
Statistische Maßeinheit für die verordnete
Arzneimittelmenge – erlaubt
Mengenvergleiche unabhängig vom Preis.
Zwangsrabatt Gesetzlich vorgeschriebener
Pflichtrabatt
Umgangssprachlich für gesetzlich verordnete
Abschläge (z. B. Herstellerabschlag), die
Hersteller ohne Verhandlung gewähren
müssen.
ATC-Codes der Wirkstoffgruppen
Das ATC-System (Anatomisch-Therapeutisch-Chemische Klassifikation) ist das
amtliche, weltweit einheitliche Ordnungsschema der WHO für Arzneimittelwirkstoffe.
Jeder Code steht für eine bestimmte Wirkstoffgruppe. Im Fact-Sheet dienen die Codes
dazu, Umsätze markenneutral einzelnen Cluster-Bereichen zuzuordnen.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
A10C Insuline und Insulin-Analoga Blutzuckersenkende Hormonpräparate zur
Diabetes-Behandlung.
A10P SGLT2-Hemmer
Moderne orale Diabetes-Medikamente, die
Zucker über den Urin ausscheiden; auch bei
Herz- und Nierenschwäche wirksam.
A10S GLP-1-Rezeptor-Agonisten
Injizierbare Diabetes- und Adipositas-
Wirkstoffe; wachstumsstärkste Gruppe im
Markt (z. B. Semaglutid).
B01 Antithrombotische Mittel Übergeordnete Gruppe der
Blutgerinnungshemmer.
B01F Direkte Faktor-Xa-Hemmer
Moderne orale Gerinnungshemmer zur
Schlaganfall- und Thrombosevorbeugung (z.
B. Apixaban, Rivaroxaban).
L01G Monoklonale Antikörper
(Antineoplastika) Gezielt wirkende Krebs-Antikörpertherapien.
L01H Proteinkinasehemmer
Zielgerichtete Krebsmedikamente, die
tumorfördernde Enzyme blockieren;
wachstumsstärkste Onkologie-Gruppe.
L02B Hormonantagonisten
Krebstherapien, die hormonabhängiges
Tumorwachstum bremsen (z. B. bei Prostata-
oder Brustkrebs).
L04B / L04C Immunsuppressiva /
Immunmodulatoren
Wirkstoffe gegen überschießende Immun- und
Entzündungsreaktionen (z. B. bei Rheuma,
Psoriasis).
N07A Mittel gegen Erkrankungen des
Nervensystems
Im Fact-Sheet konkret die Wirkstoffe gegen
Multiple Sklerose (MS).
Wirkstoffklassen und medizinische Fachbegriffe
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
Anti-TNF TNF-alpha-Inhibitoren
Biologika, die den Entzündungsbotenstoff
TNF-alpha blockieren (z. B. bei Rheuma,
Morbus Crohn).
ARNI Angiotensin-Rezeptor-Neprilysin-
Inhibitor
Kombinationswirkstoff zur Behandlung der
Herzschwäche (Sacubitril/Valsartan).
Biologika Biotechnologisch hergestellte
Arzneimittel
Aus lebenden Zellen gewonnene, komplexe
Wirkstoffe (z. B. Antikörper) – häufig bei Krebs
und Autoimmunerkrankungen.
BTK-Inhibitoren Bruton-Tyrosinkinase-Inhibitoren Zielgerichtete Wirkstoffe gegen bestimmte
Blutkrebsarten.
CD38-Antikörper Antikörper gegen das
Oberflächenmerkmal CD38
Krebstherapie, v. a. beim multiplen Myelom
(Knochenmarkkrebs).
CDK-Inhibitoren Cyclin-abhängige-Kinase-
Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Wirkstoffe, u. a. beim
Brustkrebs.
CGRP-Antagonisten Calcitonin-Gene-Related-Peptide-
Antagonisten
Moderne Migräne-Wirkstoffe; eine der fünf
Pilotgruppen für Rabattverträge.
Checkpoint-Inhibition Immun-Checkpoint-Hemmung Krebs-Immuntherapie, die die körpereigene
Immunabwehr gegen Tumorzellen „entfesselt“.
EGFR-Inhibitoren Epidermal-Growth-Factor-
Receptor-Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebstherapie, u. a. bei
Lungenkrebs.
Faktor-Xa-Hemmer Direkte orale Antikoagulanzien Blutgerinnungshemmer zur Schlaganfall- und
Thrombosevorbeugung (siehe ATC B01F).
GLP-1-Agonisten GLP-1-Rezeptor-Agonisten Diabetes- und Adipositas-Wirkstoffe (z. B.
Semaglutid, Tirzepatid); siehe ATC A10S.
HFrEF / HFpEF Herzinsuffizienz mit reduzierter /
erhaltener Pumpfunktion
Zwei medizinische Formen der
Herzschwäche.
Interleukin-Inhibitoren Hemmstoffe von Interleukinen
Biologika, die entzündungsfördernde
Botenstoffe (Interleukine) blockieren (z. B. bei
Psoriasis).
JAK-Inhibitoren Januskinase-Inhibitoren
Niedermolekulare (Tabletten-)Wirkstoffe gegen
Autoimmunerkrankungen; eine der fünf
Rabattvertrags-Pilotgruppen.
MAB Monoklonale Antikörper
Im Labor hergestellte, hochspezifische
Antikörper (Wortendung „-mab“, z. B. bei
Krebs).
MS Multiple Sklerose Chronisch-entzündliche Erkrankung des
zentralen Nervensystems.
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
PARP-Inhibitoren Poly-ADP-Ribose-Polymerase-
Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebstherapie (u. a. Eierstock-,
Brustkrebs); eine der fünf Rabattvertrags-
Pilotgruppen.
PCSK9-Inhibitoren PCSK9-Hemmer
Cholesterinsenker zur Vorbeugung von Herz-
Kreislauf-Ereignissen; eine der fünf
Rabattvertrags-Pilotgruppen.
PD-1 / PD-L1-
Inhibitoren
Programmed-Cell-Death-(Ligand)-
Inhibitoren
Zentrale Krebs-Immuntherapien (Checkpoint-
Inhibitoren); eine der fünf Rabattvertrags-
Pilotgruppen.
Proteinkinasehemmer Kinase-Inhibitoren
Zielgerichtete Krebsmedikamente, die
tumorfördernde Enzyme blockieren (siehe
ATC L01H).
SGLT2-Hemmer Natrium-Glucose-Cotransporter-2-
Hemmer
Diabetes-Wirkstoffe mit Zusatznutzen bei
Herz- und Nierenschwäche (siehe ATC A10P).
Einheiten und sonstige Abkürzungen
Abkürzung / Begriff Bedeutung / Auflösung Kurze Erläuterung
DDD Defined Daily Dose (definierte
Tagesdosis)
Statistische Vergleichseinheit für verordnete
Arzneimittelmengen.
F&E Forschung und Entwicklung Ausgaben für die Erforschung und
Entwicklung neuer Arzneimittel.
Mrd. € Milliarden Euro
Mio. € Millionen Euro
p. a. per annum (pro Jahr)
Q1–Q4 Quartale 1 bis 4 eines Jahres
Verteilung des GKV-Umsatzes nach Erkrankungsschwere (2025)
Das GKV-BStabG belastet ausgerechnet den Marktteil am stärksten, der die Versorgung Schwerstkranker sichert und die forschungs- und investitionsstärkste Industrie Deutschlands trägt.6F
Die vier Therapie-Cluster (Datenbasis 2025)
Übersicht: Cluster-Umsätze im GKV-Markt 2025
Cluster Onkologie & Immuntherapien
Cluster Autoimmun- & entzündliche Erkrankungen
Cluster Diabetes & Stoffwechsel
Cluster Herz-Kreislauf & Thrombose
Die pharmarelevanten Maßnahmen des GKV-BStabG
(Dynamischer) Herstellerabschlag (§ 130a Abs. 1b SGB V-E)
Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel
(§ 130e SGB V-E, neu)
Preis-Mengen-Regelung
Kumulative Wirkung der Maßnahmen
Herstellerabschlag, Rabattverträge für patentgeschützte Arzneimittel und die Preis-Mengen greifen gleichzeitig und übereinander in die Innovationscluster Onkologie, Autoimmun, Diabetes und Herz-Kreislauf ein. Diese kumulierenden Effekte werden sich un...
Mehrfachbelastung je Cluster
Zwei exemplarische Beispiele wie sich die Kumulation finanziell auswirken wird am Beispiel des statischen Herstellerabschlages
Einordnung und Methodik
Gesetze und Paragrafen
Institutionen, Verbände und Datenquellen
Sparmaßnahmen und Begriffe der Preisregulierung
ATC-Codes der Wirkstoffgruppen
Wirkstoffklassen und medizinische Fachbegriffe
Einheiten und sonstige Abkürzungen
03.07.2026
Datei